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Evolution of the Courtroom
SUSAN A. BANDES AND NEAL FEIGENSON†
ABSTRACT
Faith in the legitimating power of the live hearing or
trial performed at the place of justice is at least as old as the
Iliad. In public courtrooms, litigants appear together,
evidence is presented, and decisions are openly and formally
pronounced. The bedrock belief in the importance of the
courtroom is rooted in common law, constitutional
guarantees, and venerated tradition, as well as in folk
knowledge. Courtrooms are widely believed to imbue
adjudication with “a mystique of authenticity and
legitimacy.” The COVID-19 pandemic, however, by
compelling legal systems throughout the world to turn from
physical courtrooms to virtual ones, disrupts and calls into
question longstanding assumptions about the conditions
essential for the delivery of justice. These questions are not
merely tangential; they implicate many of the core beliefs
undergirding the U.S. system of justice, including the whole
notion of “a day in court” as the promise of a synchronous,
physically situated event with a live audience. Rather than
†Susan A. Bandes, Centennial Professor of Law Emeritus, DePaul University
College of Law; Neal Feigenson, Professor of Law, Quinnipiac Law School. The
authors wish to thank Casey Doherty and Rana Hamadeh, DePaul University
School of Law Class of 2021, for superb research assistance.
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regard virtual courts as just an unfortunate expedient,
temporary or not, we use them as an occasion to reflect on
the essential goals of the justice system and to re-examine
courtroom practices in light of those goals. We draw on social
science to help identify what can be justified after the myths
are pared away. Focusing on three interrelated aspects of
traditional courts—the display and interpretation of
demeanor evidence; the courtroom as a physical site of
justice; and the presence of the public—we prompt a
reassessment of what our legal culture should value most in
courtroom adjudication and what we are willing to trade off
to achieve it.
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INTRODUCTION
Faith in the legitimating power of the live hearing or
trial performed at the place of justice is at least as old as the
Iliad. Common-law societies have for centuries held it up as
an exemplary form of adjudication and even as the “central
institution of law as we know it.”1 In this form of
adjudication, evidentiary hearings and trials are live events,
conducted in dedicated spaces to which members of the
public and the press generally have access,2 at which
litigants appear at the same time and participate; evidence,
especially testimony, is presented; and decisions are publicly
and formally pronounced. And throughout, participants can
observe one other as they variously testify, argue, watch, and
listen. The liveness, momentousness, and visibility of
hearings and trials are all components of the familiar
metaphors of the courtroom as stage and the trial as theater,
which remind us that an audiencee—in the courtroom
gallery or watching at home—is always at least notionally
part of the performance as well.3 The whole is greater than
1. ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DEATH
James Boyd White).

OF THE

AMERICAN TRIAL 3 (2009) (quoting

2. These are sometimes conducted remotely via broadcast or livestream,
sometimes via media accounts featuring artists’ sketches.
3. As we readily acknowledge, much actual dispute resolution does not
conform to this model of courtroom adjudication. First, many disputes are not
decided on the basis of full, open hearings in traditional courts. The great
majority of claims on or sanctions implemented by the government are
adjudicated in quasi- or barely public administrative courts. A growing
preponderance of claims between private parties are channeled by contract or by
the courts into mediation or arbitration. Additionally, more than 95% of all
formal civil and criminal cases ultimately settle (on the criminal side, via plea
bargains), so that a full trial never occurs. See, e.g., JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS
CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION, CONTROVERSY, AND RIGHTS IN CITYSTATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS 306–22 (2011). Second, many routine
matters in overwhelmed criminal and possibly other courts are disposed of by
judges, prosecutors, and public defenders in ways that are at best hasty and
bureaucratic. Nevertheless, over 150,000 trials took place every year in federal
and state courts before the pandemic and many times that number of evidentiary
hearings and other pretrial proceedings, so the model accurately describes a vast
amount of adjudication, as well as the ideal generally held by legal professionals
and laypeople alike.
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the sum of the parts; the trial is credited with helping judges
and jurors to transcend their individual interests and
“recognize and act upon what is beyond their ordinary
selves.”4 Yet if the trial is an “an act of practical integration
that is crucial for the health of our society,”5 the COVID-19
pandemic, with its unprecedented challenge to the viability
of live hearings, leaves us no choice but to disassemble,
scrutinize, and demystify the components of the trial in order
to find a working solution that won’t irreparably delay or
deny justice.
The move to virtual hearings6 disrupts and calls into
question longstanding assumptions about the conditions
4. Milner S. Ball, A Little Mistrust Now and Then, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 877,
887 (1998) (cited in BURNS, supra note 1).
5. BURNS, supra note 1.
6. “Virtual hearings” and “virtual courts” encompass a variety of
technologies and formats. Throughout this Article, we use these terms to refer to
proceedings conducted entirely online via videoconferencing, of which Zoom is
currently the most popular platform, see Anna-Leigh Firth, Two platforms
dominated in our poll of virtual court operations, NAT’L JUD. C. (May 13, 2020),
https://www.judges.org/news-and-info/two-platforms-dominated-in-our-poll-ofvirtual-court-operations/ (48% of responding judges reported they were using
Zoom for virtual proceedings; WebEx second at 25%), where each participant may
be physically located anywhere (although judges frequently preside while sitting
alone in their courtrooms). These proceedings should be distinguished from those
in traditional courtrooms where a single participant, typically a criminal
defendant, an applicant for parole or asylum, or a vulnerable witness appears via
video-link but everyone else is physically present in the courtroom. They should
also be distinguished from the more technologically sophisticated “distributed
courtroom,” which:
uses a physical courtroom but allows for multiple parties to appear
remotely. Rather than placing remote participants into frames on a
single screen, this configuration displays remote participants (or groups)
on separate screens arrayed around the physical courtroom. Remote
participants similarly have multiple screens, and multiple cameras. . . .
[T]his configuration [is referred to] as the “distributed courtroom” in that
the monitors are distributed around the courtroom in the “correct”
position.
Court of the Future Network, Gateways to Justice II: Guidelines for Use of Video
Links in Justice Hearings 11 (draft July 31, 2020). We recognize that even more
sophisticated and technologically advanced sorts of alternative adjudicatory
spaces, such as fully immersive virtual courtrooms, may be developed in the
future.
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essential for the delivery of justice. The stakes are most
apparent in the criminal justice system, where courts must
weigh the constitutional rights of the accused, including the
rights to speedy trial, confrontation of witnesses, and an
open courtroom, against concerns about public health and
safety. But the questions raised by the pandemic affect the
whole range of legal proceedings and interactions, including
civil suits, administrative hearings, and appellate
arguments. These questions are not merely tangential; they
implicate many of the core beliefs undergirding the U.S.
system of justice, including the whole notion of “a day in
court” as the promise of a synchronous, physically situated
event. When the legal status quo is confronted with an
unprecedented challenge of this magnitude, one
understandable impulse is to try to create a safer version
(masks, plexiglass, social distancing)7 or, alternatively, an
online simulacrum of the practices we know.
But rather than concentrate all our efforts on recreating
or returning to a pre-COVID status quo, we should make use
of this forced pause to reconsider “what is necessary and
what is possible.”8 In light of an increasingly rich body of
science and social science, lessons from the U.S. experience
and that of other legal systems, and the sheer necessity of
the current crisis, we ought to seize this moment to reevaluate many arrangements that have long been taken for
granted.
The rules that govern and shape the U.S. courtroom
experience arise from a complex blend of constitutional and
statutory mandates, deeply rooted common-law traditions,
7. See, e.g., Ann E. Marimow & Justin Jouvenal, Courts dramatically rethink
the jury trial in the era of the coronavirus, WASH. POST (July 31, 2020, 7:45 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-issues/jury-trials-coronavirus/2020/
07/31/8c1fd784-c604-11ea-8ffe-372be8d82298_story.html.
8. Bruno Latour made this point in the context of the impact of the pandemic
on climate change. Jonathan Watts, Bruno Latour: This is a global catastrophe
that has come from within, THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 2020, 11:00 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/06/bruno-latour-coronavirus-gaiahypothesis-climate-crisis.
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beliefs (largely of the untested or unsupported variety) about
human behavior, and a surprising amount of mysticism. For
example, the centrality of demeanor evidence in the U.S.
system is the product of a number of sources: textual
guarantees like the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation
Clause and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
common-law tradition of an open courtroom and its
attendant rituals, the folk-knowledge belief that demeanor is
a reliable indicator of credibility, and faith in the “elusive”
power of “sense impressions.”9 A similar spectrum of textbased rules, norms and rituals, beliefs about human
behavior, and mysticism underlies much of courtroom
practice. Courtrooms, in the words of the late legal and
literary scholar Robert Ferguson, aim to create “‘an aura,’ a
mystique of authenticity and legitimacy.”10 When
proceedings are forced onto Zoom, Webex, or other virtual
platforms, much if not all of that mystique or aura is likely
to be stripped away. Should we mourn it?
Common-law court systems seek to advance a range of
values, including inclusivity, dignity, fairness, accuracy,
transparency, and the demonstration of state authority. The
traditional features of formal adjudication reflect these basic
values and attempt to negotiate the tensions among them.
We argue for a more explicit debate about the goals of
adjudication, whether in physical or virtual courtrooms, so
that we can determine how to achieve whatever it is we value
most and what we are willing to trade off in pursuit of those
goals. This will require demystifying some of the more
opaque justifications offered for traditional practices, such as
the oft-mentioned “intangible” and “imponderable” benefits
of live, face-to-face testimony and the very “mystique” and
“aura” of the courtroom itself. We will draw on science and
social science to support our evaluations of the folk
9. Henry S. Sahm, Demeanor Evidence: Elusive and Intangible
Imponderables, 47 A.B.A. J. 580, 580 (1961); Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265,
269 (2d Cir. 1952).
10. ROBERT A. FERGUSON, THE TRIAL IN AMERICAN LIFE 68 (2007).
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psychology and mythology underlying customary beliefs
about courtroom adjudication.
We focus on three interrelated aspects of adjudication
that seem likely to change dramatically as online hearings
and trials become more and more prevalent.11 Part I will
discuss the complex psychological dynamics of the
courtroom, focusing on the display and interpretation of
demeanor evidence. Part II will discuss the courtroom as a
physical site of justice. Part III will discuss the notion of
public access to the courtroom by present spectators, the
press, and the broader public beyond the courtroom walls.
We also offer the beginnings of a normative critique,
suggesting how adjudication’s values and goals might be
reassessed and rebalanced.

11. As this Article goes to press, many hearings and even a few fully online
jury trials have already been conducted. See, e.g., Griffin v. Albanese Enterprise,
Inc., No. 16-2019-CA-1555 (Fla. Cir. Ct. August 10, 2020) (Zoom jury trial in civil
case).
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DEMEANOR

The Reigning Paradigm
Like other common-law systems,12 the U.S. court system
places tremendous faith in the importance of live witness
testimony, given in open court.13 This preference is
enshrined in the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause
and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.14 Live testimony
has, since its inception, been intimately tied to a belief that
personal observation is essential to the ability to evaluate
demeanor, and to a belief in the importance of demeanor in
the assessment of credibility and character. Demeanor
evidence “relies heavily on the interpretation of facial
expression and body language.”15 Access to witnesses’
demeanor is viewed as an aspect of fairness to the accused
and as a sign of respect for the accused’s dignity: defendants
deserve to be able to hear, see, and cross-examine the
government’s witnesses. It is also an article of faith that
access to demeanor helps decision-makers assess witnesses’
credibility and thus advances the core value of accurate
judgment. As one defense attorney grappling with the use of
surgical masks in the courtroom recently stated: “[I]f
witnesses or jurors are allowed to wear masks, it could
obscure key nonverbal cues during testimony and jury
selection. ‘We need to be able to see someone’s face in order
to judge their credibility’ . . . .”16
12. See Susan A. Bandes, Remorse, Demeanor, and the Consequences of
Misinterpretation: The Limits of Law as a Window into the Soul, 3 J.L., RELIGION
& ST. 170, 171 (2014) [hereinafter Bandes, Remorse, Demeanor, and
Consequences]. See also supra note 6 and accompanying text.
13. See Mark Bennett, The Changing Science of Memory and Demeanor–And
What It Means for Trial Judges, 101 JUDICATURE 60, 61 (2017).
14. FED. R. CIV. P. 43 (“At trial, the witnesses’ testimony must be taken in
open court unless a . . . statute . . . or other rule[] provide[s] otherwise.”); U.S.
CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
. . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”).
15. Bandes, Remorse, Demeanor, and Consequences, supra note 12, at 172.
16. Marimow & Jouvenal, supra note 7.
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These norms and beliefs about the perceived importance
of demeanor evidence affect the evaluation of live testimony
in multiple contexts. For example, judges evaluate
defendants’ demeanor when setting bail and at sentencing.
They observe the demeanors of parents and children in
resolving custody disputes. They do so when deciding
whether to deport an asylum seeker. At voir dire, lawyers
and judges attend not only to what prospective jurors say in
response to questions but to how they say it. Jurors in
personal injury cases notice whether the plaintiff appears to
be sitting uncomfortably in her chair or struggling to and
from the witness stand. Jurors may take the judge’s tone of
voice and nonverbal behavior as a cue to what the judge
thinks, and therefore what they should think, about the
witnesses and the evidence.17 And the press and public
observing a trial may rely on witnesses’ and parties’
demeanors in reaching their own opinions about whether
justice is being done.
The Critique
The Anglo-American belief in the power of demeanor
evidence as a barometer of credibility, and even a window
into “the heart and mind of the offender,”18 is tenacious and
deeply held. Unfortunately, it is also heavily reliant on
dubious folk knowledge. As Judge Frank Easterbook
observed with his customary penchant for cutting to the
chase: “The belief that many people form from watching
television and movies—that [sifting honest, persecuted
witnesses from those who are feigning] can be done by careful
attention to a witness’s demeanor—has been tested and
rejected by social scientists.”19 And for all its historical
17. See Peter David Blanck et al., The Appearance of Justice: Judges’ Verbal
and Nonverbal Behavior in Criminal Jury Trials, 38 STAN. L. REV. 89 (1985).
18. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 144 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
19. Mitondo v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 784, 788 (7th Cir. 2008); see also Judge
Posner’s opinion in United States v. Wells, 154 F.3d 412, 414 (7th Cir. 1998)
(“Judges fool themselves if they think they can infer sincerity from rhetoric and
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pedigree and the fervent loyalty it commands, in-court
evaluation of demeanor is not the only accepted means of
adducing evidence. For example, some inquisitorial systems
rely much more heavily on dossiers of documentary
evidence.20 Even the pre-pandemic U.S. system has
struggled with the issue of precisely how indispensable the
usual access to demeanor evidence is, and has on occasion
found it outweighed by other values; for example, child
sexual assault victims are generally permitted to testify from
behind a screen or via videoconference if they would
otherwise be too intimidated or traumatized to testify freely
(or at all).21 Those discrete challenges are now dwarfed by a
much larger one: the need to find safe ways to conduct trials
and hearings during a pandemic. Courts have flocked to the
alternative of videoconferencing, but virtual proceedings
create distance, disturb or erase sight lines, and in numerous
ways wreak havoc with the usual common-law tools for
evaluating demeanor. In this sense the pandemic has created
a natural experiment through which we can examine which
aspects of physical, synchronous presence are necessary to
the evaluative process, and which may be optional or even
unhelpful. Conversely, the resort to virtual courts prompts
the question whether videoconferencing technologies offer
any tools that might actually improve the process.22
demeanor.”).
20. The Dutch system is often cited as one that most strongly favors
documentary over oral, immediate evidence. See Bandes, Remorse, Demeanor,
and Consequences, supra note 12; see also supra note 3 and sources cited therein.
21. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012
(1988).
22. These efforts have already begun. See, e.g, Jenia Turner, Remote Criminal
Justice, TEXAS TECH L. REV. (forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3699045. Turner surveyed a range of criminal law
practictioners and judges on their experiences with virtual proceedings thus far.
The results, as she summarizes:
paint a complicated picture. They suggest that, on the whole, online
proceedings can save time and resources for the participants in criminal
cases and can provide broader access to the courts for the public. Yet
respondents also noted the dangers of remote justice, particularly in
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The pervasive recourse to demeanor evidence, which
live, physically co-present hearings and trials makes
possible, rests on the general belief that observation of the
facial expressions, tones of voice, and postures of others
permits us to divine their inner lives (for example, their
mental and emotional states), and therefore their credibility
and character. The underlying folk psychology rests on two
beliefs. The first is that demeanor conveys readily discernible
truths that words alone might not disclose. Facial expression
and body language, unlike language, are regarded as
spontaneous, natural, and non-manipulable.23 The second
belief, less remarked upon in the standard legal literature, is
that those truths tell observers something essential about
the “deep character” or “condition[] of [the] very soul”24 of the
person whose demeanor they’re observing.
Turning first to the issue of discerning truth, the
overwhelming weight of social science research debunks the
common-sense belief that demeanor is a reliable cue to
credibility. In general, people, including judges, are much
less accurate than they think they are when they seek to use
witnesses’ demeanor to differentiate truthful from
untruthful testimony.25 But the larger problem is that
contested or evidentiary hearings and trials. These include the inability
of the parties to present evidence and confront witnesses effectively, and
the challenges of providing effective legal assistance remotely.
Respondents also expressed concern that the court’s perception of
defendants may be negatively skewed by technology and that indigent
defendants might be disproportionately harmed by the use of remote
hearings. Defense attorneys were especially likely to be concerned about
the use of the online format and to believe that it tends to harm their
clients. Federal judges and prosecutors were also more likely than their
state counterparts to be skeptical of the benefits of online criminal
proceedings outside the context of the pandemic.
Id. (manuscript at 1).
23. See RICHARD WEISMAN, SHOWING REMORSE: LAW AND THE SOCIAL CONTROL
84 (2014).

OF EMOTION

24. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Remorse, Apology, and Mercy, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
423, 437 (2007).
25. See, e.g., Jeremy Blumenthal, A Wipe of the Hands, A Lick of the Lips: The
Validity of Demeanor Evidence in Assessing Witness Credibility, 72 NEB. L. REV.
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although most jurists and scholars focus on “truthfulness” or
“credibility” as if they are freestanding, measurable traits,
the use of demeanor evidence in practice is much broader.
Demeanor is used not merely to determine whether the
witness is reliable or honest, but to assess character more
broadly. That means demeanor matters in every case. Every
judgment of liability, guilt, or punishment is in part a moral
judgment about the deservingness of the parties, to which
their character is always relevant, notwithstanding
restrictions on character evidence that rules of evidence
impose.26 And gauging witnesses’ credibility is often bound
up with the question of whose story is most believable, which
in turn may depend on the fact-finder’s conception of the
character of the storyteller. Decision-makers may choose to
believe a witness’s story because they think the story she
tells is consistent with who they perceive her to be, and they
assess her character in part by how she tells the story, which
includes her demeanor while telling it.27 What is believable
depends as well as on the assumptions and biases28 of the
fact-finder who is evaluating the witness—whether a story
seems believable will depend on whether it resonates with
the fact-finder’s experience of the world.29
1157 (1993); Robert Fisher, The Demeanour Fallacy, 2014 N.Z. L. REV. 575 (2014);
Stephen Porter & Leanne ten Brinke, Dangerous Decisions: A Theoretical
Framework for Understanding How Judges Assess Credibility in the Courtroom,
14 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 114 (2009).
26. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404; see generally ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF
TRIAL (1999); Susan A. Bandes, Remorse and Judging, in REMORSE IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: MULTI-DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES (Steven Tudor et al. eds.,
forthcoming 2020) [hereinafter, Bandes, Remorse and Judging].
THE

27. See generally BURNS, supra note 26; NEAL FEIGENSON, EXPERIENCING
OTHER MINDS IN THE COURTROOM (2016).
28. See, e.g., M. Eve Hanan, Remorse Bias, 83 MO. L. REV. 301 (2018); Ronald
S. Everett & Barbara C. Nienstedt, Race, Remorse, and Sentence Reduction: Is
Saying You’re Sorry Enough?, 16 JUST. Q. 99 (1999); Justin D. Levinson,
Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and Misremembering,
57 DUKE L.J. 345 (2007).
29. See, e.g., Susan A. Bandes, Video, Popular Culture, and Police Excessive
Force: The Elusive Narrative of Over-Policing, in U. CHI. LEGAL F., LAW AND
URBAN INSTITUTIONS TEN YEARS AFTER THE WIRE 1, 2 (2018) (recounting the trial
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For example, rape complainants may be evaluated on
whether their demeanor reflects what the fact-finder regards
as the “appropriate” emotional reactions to a rape. For a factfinder who assumes the sole believable reaction to a rape is
intense emotion or even hysteria, complainants whose
behavior lacks strong affect will appear less credible.30
Conversely, one study of judicial reactions to victim impact
evidence showed that judges were less likely to believe rape
allegations when the complainant’s tone was angry. These
victims are “often perceived by judges as out of control and
unable to gain perspective on the crime”; one judge observed
that “excessive anger ‘can certainly backfire . . . .
[S]ometimes victims don’t understand that their hatred of
the defendant . . . undermines the credibility of what they are
saying . . . .’”31 Judges tended to find that victims who
expressed anger were dishonest or untrustworthy. They felt
that anger and outrage in the courtroom were the province
of the judge, not the complainant.32 As our culture becomes

of Police Commander Glenn Evans for assaulting Rickey Williams). Judge Diane
Cannon resolved the credibility dispute in favor of Evans, finding that Williams’
testimony of unprovoked assault “was improbable and contrary to human
experience” but that Evans’ testimony of unprovoked assault by an unarmed
civilian on an armed police officer was more plausible.
30. See Ken Armstrong & T. Christian Miller, An Unbelievable Story of Rape,
THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/
2015/12/16/an-unbelievable-story-of-rape. In this account (later adapted as a
television series called “Unbelievable”), not only was the complainant judged
unbelievable based on her lack of affect when reporting the rape; she was charged
with filing a false report. One consequence was that her rapist went on to rape at
least five other women before he was finally arrested. See also Lawrence G.
Calhoun et al., Victim Emotional Response: Effects on Social Reaction to Victims
of Rape, 20 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 17 (1981) (more emotional rape victim deemed
more credible); Franz Willem Winkel & Leendert Koppelaar, Rape Victims’ Style
of Self-Presentation and Secondary Victimization by the Environment: An
Experiment, 6 J. INTERPERS. VIOLENCE 29 (1991) (more emotional presentation led
rape victim to be perceived as more credible and cautious and less responsible for
the event).
31. MARY LAY SCHUSTER & AMY PROPEN, VICTIM ADVOCACY IN THE COURTROOM:
PERSUASIVE PRACTICES IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND CHILD PROTECTION CASES 67–
68 (2011).
32. Id.
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more sophisticated about the psychology of sexual assault,
judges and policymakers are (albeit all too gradually) coming
to understand that these sorts of reactions to rape victims
are based on unsupported folk knowledge and harmful
stereotypes about what victims “ought” to feel.
The potentially dire consequences of the belief that
demeanor is a window into the soul can also be seen quite
starkly in capital trials, in which jurors place enormous
weight on their perceptions of the defendant’s visible
remorse in determining whether to impose a death sentence.
Most capital defendants do not testify, so the evaluation is
often based entirely on their facial expressions and body
language while they sit silently at the counsel table watching
the evidence unfold. As Scott Sundby reports the findings of
the Capital Jury Project:
Jurors scrutinized the defendant throughout the course of the trial,
and they were quick to recall details about demeanor, ranging from
. . . attire to . . . facial expressions. . . . .
....
. . . [Mostly] jurors . . . deduce[d] remorselessness from the . . .
defendant’s lack of emotion during the trial, even as the prosecution
introduced . . . horrific . . . [evidence]. . . . .
. . . [The defendant’s perceived] boredom [or indifference made
jurors angry]. . . . [Some saw them] as cocky and arrogant[,]
. . . indicat[ing] . . . [they] lacked . . . human compassion . . . .33

Consider, for instance, the capital sentencing hearing of
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev,34 whose body language, including his
beard-fiddling and his tendency to lean back in his chair, was
perceived as arrogant and inappropriately informal.
33. Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and Absolution: The Intersection of
Trial Strategy, Remorse, and the Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1551, 1562–
64 (1998) (footnotes omitted).
34. See Katharine Q. Seelye, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Given Death Penalty in
Boston Marathon Bombing, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2015), https://www
.nytimes.com/2015/05/16/us/dzhokhar-tsarnaev-death-sentence.html. But see
United States v. Tsarnaev, 968 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2020) (vacating death sentence
for inadequate voir dire regarding prejudicial pretrial publicity).
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Although there is no evidence that remorse can be accurately
assessed via facial expressions, jurors tend to believe they
are well equipped to make just such an evaluation in a
matter of life or death.35 Nor are judges and the media
exempt from these beliefs.36 Indeed, studies show that judges
and other fact-finders employ cues to complex states like
remorse in an inconsistent or even contradictory manner, so
that one judge may rely on a given behavior as indicative of
remorse while another believes the same behavior indicates
lack of remorse.37
To further complicate matters, legal decision-makers’
assessments of demeanor evidence and their use of it in
reaching judgments about others’ credibility and character
are subject to several cognitive-emotional biases. These
include the fundamental attribution error (the tendency to
ascribe the behavior of others to their inherent character,
while ascribing one’s own behavior to situational factors);38
naïve realism (people’s belief that they see the world as it is,
underestimating or ignoring the effect of their own cultural,
racial, and other biases on their perceptions and
judgments);39 conversely, an egocentric bias according to
which people place undue weight on their own conscious

35. See Susan A. Bandes, Remorse and Criminal Justice, 8 EMOTION REV. 14
(2016).
36. See generally Bandes, Remorse and Judging, supra note 26.
37. See, e.g., Rocksheng Zhong, Judging Remorse, 39 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 133, 155–59, 159 n.209 (2015) (finding that some judges believed direct
eye contact was a sign of remorse, while others believed that lack of eye contact
and a demure gaze downward were signs of remorse).
38. See Hanan, supra note 28; see also Daniel T. Gilbert, Ordinary
Personology, in HANDBOOK OF SOC. PSYCHOL. 89, 130–31 (Susan T. Fiske, Daniel
T. Gilbert & Gardner Lindzey eds., 4th ed. 1998); RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS,
HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 122–27
(1980).
39. E.g., Thomas D. Gilovich & Dale W. Griffin, Judgment and Decision
Making, in HANDBOOK OF SOC. PSYCHOL. 542, 565–74 (Susan T. Fiske, Daniel T.
Gilbert & Gardner Lindzey eds., 5th ed. 2010); Robert J. Robinson et. al., Actual
Versus Assumed Differences in Construal: “Naïve Realism” in Intergroup
Perception and Conflict, 68 J. OF PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 404, 404 (1995).
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emotional responses in gauging others’ emotional states;40
and a variety of other biases that complicate the ability to
read the emotional states of others.
Some of these habits of thought strike at the heart of the
values of fairness, equality, and dignity. Reading demeanor
across racial lines is particularly fraught. This is in part an
artifact of selective empathy—the difficulty we all have
attending to and interpreting cues from members of other
cultural, racial, or ethnic groups.41 In other words, empathy
is negatively affected by difference.42 The problem is greatly
exacerbated when the subject is black, in part because of the
pernicious, tenacious perception of a linkage among
blackness, criminality, and dangerousness.43 This linkage
also translates into perceptions that black defendants are
less likely to be remorseful.44 In addition, offenders’ juvenile

40. See Kate Rossmanith, Affect and the Judicial Assessment of Offenders:
Feeling and Judging Remorse, 21 BODY & SOC. 167, 171–72 (2015) (explaining
how a judge may believe she knows the defendant is sincerely remorseful if the
judge is moved or affected by the defendant’s performance).
41. See, e.g., Everett & Nienstedt, supra note 28, at 118.
42. Bandes, Remorse, Demeanor, and Consequences, supra note 12, at 178.
43. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy: Perceived
Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts Capital Sentencing Outcomes, 17
PSYCHOL. SCI. 383, 383 (2006). More generally, there is substantial evidence that
juries simply attach a greater value to the lives of white victims and their families
than to black victims and their families. See Susan A. Bandes & Jessica M.
Salerno, Emotion, Proof, and Prejudice: The Cognitive Science of Gruesome
Photos and Victim Impact Statements, 46 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1003, 1037–40 (2014);
David R. Karp & Jerrett B. Warshaw, Their Day in Court: The Role of Murder
Victims’ Families in Capital Juror Decision Making, in WOUNDS THAT DO NOT
BIND: VICTIM-BASED PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEATH PENALTY 275, 284 (James R.
Acker & David R. Karp eds., 2006). The extent to which this association varies
based on the race of the evaluator (i.e. in situations where evaluator and subject
are both black) is complex and likely context-dependent.
44. See William J. Bowers et al., Death Sentencing in Black and White: An
Empirical Analysis of the Role of Jurors’ Race and Jury Racial Composition, 3 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 171, 257–58 (2001) (finding that viewing the same black
defendant, white decision makers saw arrogance and coldness, whereas black
decision makers saw remorse).
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status45 and mental or emotional disabilities46 can confound
the evaluation of demeanor.47
All of these problems in the perception, interpretation,
and application of demeanor evidence raise serious concerns
about whether demeanor evidence on the whole impairs the
accuracy as well as the fairness of legal decision-making.
Although our legal system is unlikely to jettison demeanor
evidence entirely, perhaps judges and policymakers can be
persuaded that it is not the gold standard for gauging
credibility and character that it’s commonly thought to be.
Once its mystical aura is pierced, and social science is
brought into the equation, demeanor evidence turns out to
need much improvement. This brings us to the question of
whether virtual court proceedings will simply replicate these
problems, exacerbate them, or possibly provide an
opportunity for reform.
Demeanor Evidence and Videoconferencing
Relying on demeanor in online proceedings is likely to
create additional difficulties because evaluating demeanor
online is very different from evaluating it in the traditional
courtroom. Pre-pandemic experience with partly virtual
hearings—for example, parole or asylum hearings in which
the applicant appears via videoconference—suggests that
witnesses and litigants will be evaluated more negatively in
virtual courts than in in-person hearings or trials. Several
studies, for instance, support the view that it’s harder for
decision-makers to empathize with those testifying on
screen, at least in the immigration, bail, and parole

45. See Martha Grace Duncan, “So Young and So Untender”: Remorseless
Children and the Expectations of the Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1469 (2002).
46. See, e.g., Laurie L. Levenson, Courtroom Demeanor: The Theater of the
Courtroom, 92 MINN. L. REV. 573, 595 n.115 (2008).
47. See generally Bandes, Remorse, Demeanor, and Consequences, supra note
12, at 185–87.
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contexts.48
48. See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Efficiency and Cost: The Impact
of Videoconferenced Hearings on Bail Decisions, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
869, 900–01 (2010); see Ingrid V. Eagly, Remote Adjudication in Immigration, 109
NW. U. L. REV. 933 (2015). Criminal defendants who appear via video-link at
arraignment, bail hearing, or sentencing offer a salient example. These
defendants may speak from jail via poor internet connections to a judge who may
be only a static-laden image on a small screen, and who may not even be looking
at the screen image of the defendant. See, e.g., PENELOPE GIBBS, DEFENDANTS ON
VIDEO–CONVEYOR BELT JUSTICE OR A REVOLUTION IN ACCESS? 8 (Transform Just.
2017). Their sense of isolation and alienation from the courtroom may be
exacerbated by the absence of their lawyers from their side, e.g., Edie Fortuna
Cimino et al., Charm City Televised & Dehumanized: How CCTV Bail Reviews
Violate Due Process, 44 U. BALT. L.F. 57, 77–87 (2014), as well as the meanness
of their physical surroundings in the video room in the jailhouse and the sounds
of the noises of jail. Carolyn McKay, Video Links from Prison: Court ‘Appearance’
within Carceral Space, 14 LAW, CULTURE, & HUMAN. 242, 252–54, 258, 260 (2018);
see also CAMILLE GOURDET ET AL., COURT APPEARANCES IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
THROUGH TELEPRESENCE 8 (Priority Crim. Just. Needs Initiative 2020). Juvenile
or mentally challenged defendants may find it especially difficult to understand
what’s going on. E.g., Gerald G. Ashdown & Michael A. Menzel, The Convenience
of the Guillotine: Video Proceedings in Federal Prosecutions, 80 DENVER U. L. REV.
63, 81, 84 (2002); GIBBS, supra. While the image quality may be better in current
iterations of videoconferencing software than it was in the remote appearances
studied by the many researchers cited above, and while defendants may not be
uniquely stigmatized in fully virtual courtrooms because all parties, rather than
only the defendant, are appearing on the screen (although the defendants will
still be the only ones on Zoom clothed in prison outfits and seen behind locked
doors—quite stigmatizing), the comparison to the traditional courtroom makes
plain the importance of one thing that’s missing on Zoom: the physical copresence of defendant and judge. We discuss this further below.
This body of research raises fascinating questions about whether the effect of
video technology itself on decision-makers’ empathy may be confounded with
other features of the mediated interaction, such as the unprepossessing or even
downright stigmatizing views of remote defendants to which the camera typically
provides access, and whether the outcome may be qualified by decision-makers’
pre-existing stores of empathy toward the witness or litigant. The research to
date does not provide a clear answer to the latter question. Only one study has
manipulated video vs. live appearance as an independent variable and measured
empathy as a dependent variable; it found that mock jurors did not feel less
empathy for a child witness who testified via CCTV vs. one testifying live. See
Holly K. Orcutt et al., Detecting Deception in Children’s Testimony: Factfinders’
Abilities to Reach the Truth in Open Court and Closed-Circuit Trials, 25 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 339 (2001). On the other hand, several studies measuring responses
that could be construed as loose proxies for empathy (e.g., likeability) have found
that persons are regarded more favorably when encountered live vs. via a screen.
E.g., Sara Landström et al., Witnesses Appearing Live Versus on Video: Effects on
Observers’ Perception, Veracity Assessments and Memory, 19 APPLIED COGNITIVE
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Perceptual and social psychological research offers many
possible reasons for this effect. The most obvious is the
reduction in eye contact. Virtual court guidelines recommend
that participants look at the camera when speaking, but even
people with extensive videoconferencing experience will
often look at the screen display instead, because they want
to see how their words are being received and because the
images of others’ faces are more visually interesting than the
green camera light on their laptop or other camera. When
they look at the screen instead of the camera, they will not
appear to be looking at the viewer. Viewers may then
construe this apparent lack of eye contact, or the frequent
shifting of the eyes away from direct contact and back again,
as a sign that the speaker is being uncertain or even
dishonest.49 And while witnesses will be looking at the
interface to determine which participants are looking
carefully at them as they speak, the small size of others’
images and the lack of mutual alignment of gaze may make
this difficult to determine. As a result, witnesses may lose
PSYCHOL. 913 (2005); DAVID TAIT ET AL., TOWARDS A DISTRIBUTED COURTROOM
(2017). On the effects of the remote participants’ environment on their own and
others’ perceptions of video-mediated adjudication, see, for example, EMMA
ROWDEN ET AL., GATEWAYS TO JUSTICE: DESIGN AND OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR
REMOTE PARTICIPATION IN COURT PROCEEDINGS (2013).
49. E.g., Ernst Bekkering & J.P. Shim, Trust in Videoconferencing, 49 COMM.
ACM 103 (2006); Gordon D. Hemsley & Anthony N. Doob, The Effect of Looking
Behavior on Perceptions of a Communicator’s Credibility, 8 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 136 (1978); Molly Treadway Johnson & Elizabeth C. Wiggins,
Videoconferencing in Criminal Proceedings: Legal and Empirical Issues and
Directions for Research, 28 J.L. & POL’Y 211 (2006). Relatedly, from the
perspective of perceivers, because the videoconferencing interface does not
accurately recreate a common spatial environment which co-participants occupy,
participants cannot reliably track each others’ gazes or understand the
contextual meaning of their gestures, a problem which has been shown to
decrease trust in intergroup videoconferenced communications. DAVID NGUYEN &
JOHN CANNY, MULTIVIEW: IMPROVING TRUST IN GROUP VIDEO CONFERENCING
THROUGH SPATIAL FAITHFULNESS, 1465 (SIGCHI Conf. Hum. Factors in
Computing Sys. Proc. Apr. 28–May 3, 2007) [hereinafter NGUYEN & CANNY,
MULTIVIEW]. Videoconferencing systems that correct for distortions or absence of
gaze information, such as Nguyen and Canny’s Multiview system or the
“distributed courtroom” system which David Tait and colleagues have tested, can
reduce or avoid these negative effects. TAIT ET AL., supra note 48.
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access to the sorts of feedback they would ordinarily receive
in the physical courtroom.50 This ongoing sense of
uncertainty about whether they are truly being paid
attention to and understood may be reflected in witnesses’
demeanor while testifying, which decision-makers may then
construe as a lack of confidence51 or lack of interactivity,52
either of which may be misread to indicate diminished
credibility. “Understanding the [nonverbal] language of eyes
enables perceivers to attribute mental states to others,”53
and it is easier for viewers to do this when the other person
gazes directly at them. For instance, viewers have more
difficulty rapidly identifying others’ emotional expressions
when those others avert their gaze.54 In face-to-face
interactions, “the level of emotionality in the encounter [can]
be regulated by the amount of mutual gaze the participants
permit[] each other,”55 but if there is little mutual gaze to
begin with or, more to the point, if no one can be sure when
mutual gaze is occurring, people will struggle to deploy their
emotional intelligence to assess the situation.

50. But see Ian Ballon, How Working From Home May Change Federal Court
Litigation for the Better, NAT’L L.J., (Aug. 4, 2020), https://www.law.com/
nationallawjournal/2020/08/04/how-working-from-home-may-change-federalcourt-litigation-for-the-better/ (arguing that “Zoom and similar technologies . . .
allow you to see how your own facial expressions appear to the judge—and adjust
them accordingly”). Seasoned litigators may well be more able than anxious
laypeople to take advantage of this function.
51. E.g., Neil Brewer & Anne Burke, Effects of Testimonial Inconsistencies
and Eyewitness Confidence on Mock-Juror Judgments, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
353 (2002); Elizabeth R. Tenney et al., Calibration Trumps Confidence as a Basis
for Witness Credibility, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. 46 (2007).
52. Judee K. Burgoon et al., The Role of Conversational Involvement in
Deceptive Interpersonal Interactions, 25 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 669,
682 (1999).
53. C. Neil Macrae et al., Are You Looking at Me? Eye Gaze and Person
Perception, 13 PSYCHOL. SCI. 460, 463 (2002).
54. See Markus Bindemann et al., How do eye gaze and facial expression
interact?, 16 VISUAL COGNITION 708 (2008).
55. Adam Kendon, Some Functions of Gaze-Direction in Social Interactions,
26 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 22, 58 (1967).
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Witnesses in proceedings on Zoom are also likely to
testify differently than they would in physical courtrooms for
half a dozen other reasons, none of which bode well for
judges’ and jurors’ construals of their demeanor. Witnesses
who pause before answering a question due to connectivity
issues not obvious to others could be construed as hesitant or
uncertain, and hence less credible.56 Those who fidget
excessively due to the unfamiliarity, discomfort, or boredom
of sitting for hours in front of their computer screens may be
perceived as less credible.57 Those who would gain
reassurance on the stand from seeing supportive friends or
family members in the physical courtroom will be deprived
of that on Zoom and, as a consequence, may be less confident
or forthcoming.58 Witnesses who see themselves in a window
on the interface as they testify59 may be distracted,
increasing their cognitive load,60 which in turn may

56. Bekkering & Shim, supra note 49.
57. Porter & Ten Brinke, supra note 25.
58. See Joe Miller, 7 Great Rules for Bringing Friends to Court, FAM. L. COACH
(June 1, 2015), https://thefamilylawcoach.com/blog/7-great-rules-for-bringingfriends-to-court/ (persons going to family court are often advised to bring a family
member or friend to the courtroom to help them stay calm and focused); Amanda
Konradi, Preparing to Testify: Rape Survivors Negotiating the Criminal Justice
Process, 10 GENDER & SOC’Y 404, 416–18 (discussing how some rape survivors
enlist “team members” to attend trial to provide support during testimony); see
also Levenson, supra note 46, at 593–94 (describing how presence in the
courtroom of his brother and co-defendant Erik Menendez drew out Lyle
Menendez’s emotional apology on stand). However, having friends or family in
court may not always benefit the witness. See Miller, supra (the presence of
friends may stoke anger); Jennifer A. Scarduzio & Sarah J. Tracy, Sensegiving
and Sensebreaking via Emotion Cycles and Emotional Buffering: How Collective
Communication Creates Order in the Courtroom, 29 MGMT. COMM. Q. 331, 343
(2015) (inappropriate behavior); see also Amanda Konradi, Pulling Strings
Doesn’t Work in Court: Moving Beyond Puppetry in the Relationship Between
Prosecutors and Rape Survivors, 10 J. SOC. DISTRESS & HOMELESS 5, 17 (2001)
(some rape survivors feel grief when observing from the witness stand the pain
of family members listening to them describe the assault).
59. As they will unless the court disables the self-view function.
60. See Ryan G. Horn & Tara S. Behrend, Video Killed the Interview Star:
Does Picture-in-Picture Affect Interview Performance?, 3 PERSONNEL ASSESSMENT
& DECISIONS 51 (2017).
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adversely affect their mood and be reflected in their
demeanor. Seeing themselves may also make anxious
witnesses feel even more anxious and further impair their
performance.61 Finally, as has often been noted, the casual,
familiar environment of the home or office from which
remote witnesses will testify, as well as their physical
distance from the authority of the court, may lead them,
especially those unaccustomed to participating in formal
legal proceedings, to dress or behave in ways that would be
inappropriate in the physical courtroom62 (even though they
have taken the oath and been reminded by the judge that
they are “in court,” and may have been prepared by the
lawyer calling them to testify); as a consequence, the judge
or jurors may evaluate their attitude and character more
negatively.
To be sure, some litigants may behave on Zoom in ways
that lead decision-makers to evaluate them more positively.
Witnesses who might be intimidated by the formality of the
courtroom or the physically co-present judge may testify
more confidently and coherently from the comfort of their
homes.63 This would presumably be reflected in their
demeanors, which the judge or jurors could then read (or
misread) as cues to truthfulness.64
Nontestimonial demeanor is also likely to be different on
Zoom. As with testifying witnesses, differences between
private and courtroom environments may lead nontestifying
parties and others to dress inappropriately or display

61. See Jürgen Wegge, Communication via Videoconference: Emotional and
Cognitive Consequences of Affective Personality Dispositions, Seeing One’s Own
Picture, and Disturbing Events, 21 HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION 273 (2006).
But cf. Ballon, supra note 50.
62. See GIBBS, supra note 48, at 49.
63. See Orcutt et al., supra note 48.
64. See Gail S. Goodman et al., Face-to-Face Confrontation: Effects of ClosedCircuit Technology on Children’s Eyewitness Testimony and Jurors’ Decisions, 22
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 165 (1998).
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inappropriate nonverbal behaviors.65 Participants’ facial
expressions and postures may also express the strain of
attending to an extended videoconferencing session or their
occasional frustration with glitches in the technology, either
of which others may misconstrue as lack of respect for the
proceedings—or perhaps as a disgruntled or hostile response
to another participant’s words.
Not only will witnesses and parties behave differently in
virtual courtrooms in ways that will be reflected in their
demeanors; those who are watching and listening will
perceive and interpret what they see and hear differently
than they would in a physical courtroom. Consider first how
the visual and audio information available through the Zoom
interface differs from what can be seen and heard in an
unmediated, physically co-present encounter. In one respect,
videoconferencing may offer better access to demeanor
evidence: the close-up image of a testifying witness in
speaker view may actually occupy more of the observers’
visual field (and perhaps be better lit) than the view they
would have in a physical courtroom, allowing them to
observe the witness’s facial expressions more closely than
they would at courtroom viewing distance and angles. As one
judge reported after conducting a summary jury trial in a
civil matter, the attorneys conducting voir dire were
surprised that the online view provided even more
information about juror demeanor that they would have had
in court. “Online . . . ‘you see the whole face, eyebrow
twitches, and panel members are way more relaxed’ sitting
at home, instead of in a courtroom.”66

65. See, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, Lawyers are dressing way too casual
during Zoom court hearings, judge says, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 15, 2020, 9:24 AM),
https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/lawyers-are-dressing-way-too-casualduring-zoom-hearings-judge-says (judge admonishes attorneys for, among other
behaviors, appearing for Zoom court while in bed, still under the covers).
66. Marimow & Jouvenal, supra note 7 (quoting Judge Emily Miskel).
However, as the authors note, the Zoom proceeding sometimes adds a sound that
rarely intrudes on in-person trials: the flush of a toilet.
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In several other respects, though, Zoom affords much
less visual information about others’ demeanors. Most
images on the interface are small; even speaking witnesses
will appear in small frames if the proceedings are shown in
gallery view.67 All other things being equal, smaller images
tend to create less emotional impact,68 so whatever demeanor
observers think they discern is likely to have less effect on
their judgments. The size of the frame in which each person
appears on Zoom, the fact that they will usually be seated for
the duration, and their distance from their own cameras
ordinarily means that viewers will see only witnesses’ and
parties’ heads and upper bodies. In contrast to the views
afforded in physical court, judges and jurors will not have
much if any sense of witnesses’ and parties’ posture or bodily
movements other than shifting in their seats, depriving them
of cues that people use to read others’ demeanor in their

67. And these images are small not only in relation to the interface but to the
viewer’s visual field as a whole; most participants will see everything within the
frame of what is likely a 17” or smaller computer screen, rather than a larger
courtroom screen or in person.
68. Maurizio Codispoti & Andrea de Cesarei, Arousal and Attention: Picture
Size and Emotional Reactions, 44 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 680 (2007); Byron Reeves
et al., The Effects of Screen Size and Message Content on Attention and Arousal,
1 MEDIA PSYCHOL. 49 (1999). On the other hand, the small rectangle within which
each Zoom participant is framed tends to call attention to that person’s
demeanor, to the extent anyone is observing it, in a way that would not be true
in the un-demarcated spatial surround of the physical courtroom. Inside the
frame within the interface, the view of each participant becomes something like
a close-up (or medium close-up) shot in a movie, with the implicit message, “Pay
attention to the emotions this face is showing!” As Noël Carroll and William
Seeley put it: “Indexing [in filmmaking] involves pointing the camera at
something, thereby communicating, ‘Look here!’ Indexing occurs naturally when
the camera is brought closer to its subject by means of a cut, zoom, or camera
movement.” Noël Carroll & William Seeley, Cognitivism, Psychology, and
Neuroscience: Movies as Attentional Engines, PSYCHOCINEMATICS: EXPLORING
COGNITION AT THE MOVIES 49, 62 (Arthur P. Shimamura ed., 2013); see also
Wendy P. Heath & Bruce D. Grannemann, How Video Image Size Interacts with
Evidence Strength, Defendant Emotion, and the Defendant–Victim Relationship
to Alter Perceptions of the Defendant, 32 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 496 (2014) (finding
complex interactions among the size of the screen on which a testifying defendant
appeared, the level of emotion the defendant displayed, the nature of the case,
and the strength of the evidence against the defendant).
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everyday lives69 and that have, for better or worse, been
considered important in physical trials (see for example the
emphasis in the Tsarnaev sentencing hearing on what one
journalist called “his toe-tapping, his beard-fiddling, the way
he leans back in his chair with this collar open like he’s a
Hollywood studio exec at a pitch meeting”70) and that judges
find important in assessing offenders’ remorse.71 Nor,
because each participant to the proceeding logs on and
becomes visible only when already seated in front of his or
her computer, will observers be able to see parties or
witnesses walking to and from their positions in the
courtroom (or see them in the hallways outside of the
physical courtroom)—species of “offstage” behavior to which
fact-finders often attach significance.72 Some participants,
notwithstanding published guidance to the contrary, will
appear in suboptimal lighting, which will make their facial
expressions harder to see, or in cluttered environments,
which will complicate the effort to identify the emotional

69. E.g., Beatrice de Gelder, Towards the Neurobiology of Emotional Body
Language, 7 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 242 (2006); Dacher Keltner &
Jennifer S. Lerner, Emotion, in HANDBOOK OF SOC. PSYCHOL. 317, 321–23 (Susan
T. Fiske, Daniel T. Gilbert & Gardner Lindzey eds., 5th ed. 2010).
70. Seth Stevenson, The Implacable Bomber, SLATE (Mar. 5, 2015, 9:45 PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2015/03/tsarnaev-trial-dzhokhar-appearsunmoved-by-a-day-of-grisly-testimony.html.
71. Rossmanith, supra note 40, at 170–71. On the relationship between the
view that the video camera affords of the other person’s body and empathy for
the other person, one study comparing head-only to upper-body views of the other
person and both with face-to-face communication found that head-only views
resulted in less empathy for the other by some but not all measures. DAVID T.
NGUYEN & JOHN CANNY, MORE THAN FACE-TO-FACE: EMPATHY EFFECTS OF VIDEO
FRAMING, 423 (SIGCHI Conf. Hum. Factors in Computing Sys. Proc. Apr. 6,
2009). The view of other participants available on Zoom varies depending on their
camera angle, how far they sit from the camera, and so on, see infra text
accompanying notes 78–82, but generally ranges somewhere between these
researchers’ head-only and upper-body viewing conditions.
72. Mary R. Rose & Shari Seidman Diamond, Offstage Behavior: Real Jurors’
Scrutiny of Non-Testimonial Conduct, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 311 (2009); Mary R.
Rose et al., Goffman on the Jury: Real Jurors’ Attention to the “Offstage” of Trials,
34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 310 (2010).
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valence of their expressions.73 Videoconferencing may also
provide less audio information than in-person courtroom
speech does, impairing decision-makers’ ability to discern
the emotions conveyed by the sound of the voice.74
The increased cognitive demands of participating in an
extended Zoom proceeding75 and possibly the lesser drama in
a videoconferenced as opposed to a physically co-present trial
(we’ll return to this point in Part II) may reduce judges’ and
jurors’ ability to pay attention to whatever they take to be
demeanor evidence.76 Their ability to concentrate on a given
witness or party may be further impaired by the
simultaneous appearance on the interface of other
participants (including themselves), offering a constant
source of distraction, in an array that may shift, sometimes
without notice, as persons are dropped or added. This
increased mental effort that judges and jurors must allocate
to what they are doing in the virtual courtroom may itself

73. See James E. Cutting & Kacie L. Armstrong, Facial Expression, Size, and
Clutter: Inferences from Movie Structure to Emotion Judgments and Back, 78
ATTENTION, PERCEPTION, & PSYCHOPHYSICS 891 (2016).
74. Elizabeth C. Wiggins, What We Know and What We Need to Know about
the Effects of Courtroom Technology, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 731, 738 (2004)
(“[W]hen voice is transmitted through phone lines as with videoconferencing, a
middle bandwidth filter is used. This means that low and high frequencies of the
voice are cut off. Thus, the content of the voice message is heard and understood,
but some information about the emotional state of the speaker, which is carried
in the higher frequencies, may be partly excluded. It is precisely this information
that may be critical to judgments of the defendant’s remorse and credibility.”).
75. E.g., Kate Murphy, Why Zoom is Terrible, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/29/sunday-review/zoom-video-conference.
html.
76. Indeed, given the small size of the frames in which everyone appears in
gallery view, noted earlier, and the fact that the user’s audio all comes from a
single source (the computer’s speakers or the headphones) and thus does not
provide the locational cues that natural audio usually does, not to mention the
absence of the understood “spatial arrangement of persons and artifacts” in the
physical courtroom, Christian Licoppe & Laurence Dumoulin, The “Curious Case”
of an Unspoken Opening Speech Act: A Video-Ethnography of the Use of Video
Communication in Courtroom Activities, 43 RES. ON LANGUAGE & SOC.
INTERACTION 211, 219 (2010), it may sometimes be hard, at least for a moment,
just to tell who’s speaking.

1302

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

bias their impressions of witnesses’ and parties’ demeanors.
If they find it hard to watch and listen to a witness due to
poor audio quality (which may be due to the speaker’s
microphone, the user’s computer speakers or earphones, or
either’s internet connection), the lack of synchronicity
between video and audio, or simply the strain of attending
closely throughout extended proceedings, they may be
inclined to misattribute their negative feelings arising from
those processing difficulties to the witness himself and to
evaluate him less favorably.77
Even more troubling, the factors that affect judges’ and
jurors’ construals of witnesses’ and parties’ demeanors will
also vary from one witness or party to another, biasing their
relative assessments. To start with a salient example, the
apparent sizes of participants’ faces may vary enormously
depending largely on how far they sit from their cameras.
While movie directors know that showing faces in close-ups
as opposed to longer shots allows audiences to identify the
faces’ emotional valence more easily,78 faces that appear too
close may seem to be occupying observers’ personal space,79
which observers may regard as inappropriate and annoying
or even threatening.80 Conversely, witnesses whose faces
appear much smaller than others may be granted less
importance. Varying camera angles may also bias judges’
and jurors’ evaluations of witnesses and parties. Standard
filmmaking texts teach that high angle shots tend to make
the person depicted appear smaller or weaker, while low
angle shots make the person seem more significant and
powerful,81 and experimental studies have found that faces
77. This effect is called cognitive fluency. See Eryn Newman et al., Cognitive
Fluency in the Courtroom, in THE ROUTLEDGE INT’L HANDBOOK OF LEGAL AND
INVESTIGATIVE PSYCHOL. 102 (Ray Bull & Iris Blandón-Gitlin eds., 2020).
78. Cutting & Armstrong, supra note 73.
79. See EDWARD T. HALL, THE HIDDEN DIMENSION (Anchor Books ed., 1969).
80. See John Storck & Lee Sproull, Through a Glass Darkly: What Do People
Learn in Videoconferences?, 22 HUM. COMM. RES. 197, 200 (1995).
81. ROY THOMPSON & CHRISTOPHER J. BOWEN, GRAMMAR

OF THE

SHOT 41–43
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seen from below are perceived more positively than faces
seen from above.82 Finally, context matters: “[W]hen a
person looks at a human face with the goal of perceiving
emotion, the perceiver encodes the face in context,”83 so the
various backgrounds that appear behind different witnesses
and parties may affect judges’ and jurors’ interpretations of
their demeanors differently.
Crucially, judges and jurors may remain unaware of how
these features of the videoconferencing medium are
influencing their evaluations and decisions. Instead, they
will intuitively think that they are perceiving others’ facial
expressions, tones of voice, and postures “as they really are.”
This is naïve realism.84 And they will discount or ignore the
extent to which the demeanors that witnesses and parties
are displaying are due to the situation in which those
witnesses and parties find themselves—not just in court but
in court on Zoom, talking to their computer screens and
aware of other participants only as multiple head-and-uppertorso images in the interface. This is the fundamental
attribution error.85 Both biases will likely be exacerbated in
virtual proceedings precisely because of the interposition of
the medium between observer and observed.86
(2d ed., 2009).
82. Arvid Kappas et al., Angle of Regard: The Effect of Vertical Viewing Angle
on the Perception of Facial Expressions, 18 J. NONVERBAL BEHAV. 263 (1994); cf.
Bekkering & Shim, supra note 49, at 106–07 (finding that subjects recorded from
above or from the side are trusted less compared with those looking straight into
the camera).
83. Lisa Feldman Barrett & Elizabeth A. Kensinger, Context is Routinely
Encoded During Emotion Perception, 21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 595, 598 (2010).
84. NEAL FEIGENSON & CHRISTINA SPIESEL, LAW ON DISPLAY 9–10 (2009).
85. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
86. Whether judges’ and jurors’ awareness of the effects of the medium on
their interpretations of demeanor evidence and their use of it in their judgments
will be informed at all by their own increased familiarity with Zoom is an open
question. Knowing in a general way how the camera angle and other features of
videoconferencing distort appearances is one thing; being mindful of specific
biasing effects while paying attention to the hearing or trial and knowing how to
adjust one’s thinking to account for those biases is another thing entirely. See,
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The perception and evaluation of others’ demeanor will
also be different in virtual court because the phenomenology
of virtual environments differs from that of direct, face-toface experience. Most importantly, the feeling of co-presence,
the sense of being together with others in the world, is very
different. Co-presence does not simply disappear when
physical co-location does; indeed, some have argued that
online interactions, including online legal proceedings, are
capable of producing a psychologically rich sense of copresence, defined as “the synchronization of mutual
attention, emotion, and behavior.”87 However, Zoom makes
it very hard to achieve the kind of co-presence that exists in
a physical courtroom.88 In principle, each participant in the
videoconferenced proceeding can see and hear everyone else
in real time, an essential condition for synchronization and
hence co-presence. That synchronous access, however, can be
impaired or disrupted: People may be dropped from the
session without warning due to connectivity issues, and the
audio may be glitchy or lag, upsetting the precise
coordination of facial expression and voice that is critical to
how we attend to each other’s emotional displays in everyday
life. Moreover, the difficulty (impossibility, really) of
e.g., Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental
Correction: Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 117 (1994) (discussing debiasing).
87. Celeste Campos-Castillo & Steven Hitlin, Copresence: Revisiting a
Building Block for Social Interaction Theories, 31 SOC. THEORY 168, 171 (2013).
Sociologist Meredith Rossner, Rossner, Remote Rituals in a Virtual Court (2020)
(unpublished paper) (on file with authors), has applied this notion of co-presence
to the distributed courtroom. See supra note 6. For a review of various concepts
of social presence in networked environments, see Frank Biocca et al., Toward a
More Robust Theory and Measure of Social Presence: Review and Suggested
Criteria, 12 PRESENCE 456 (2003).
88. A majority of respondents to Jenia Turner’s survey, see supra note 22 at
56, expressed concern about the negative impact of virtual proceedings on
credibility determinations, with defense attorneys expressing the greatest degree
of concern. One defense attorney evocatively observed that “fact finders must be
able to see a witness’ reaction to questioning in the flesh, where they can observe
body language. And witnesses should not feel the safety of video distancing
during questioning. They need to feel confronted, and the eyes of scrutiny upon
them.”
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establishing genuine eye contact (if a speaker appears to be
looking at you, that almost certainly means he or she isn’t)
disrupts the ongoing reciprocation of gaze, which is usually
important for feeling engaged with the other person.89
This points to one important reason why the diminished
sense of co-presence matters to legal judgment: it can impair
judges’ and jurors’ ability to empathize with a witness or
party. While empathy may arise in various ways, its
paradigmatic source is through physically co-present
personal interaction, “an immediately felt correspondence
between
the
kinesthetically
perceived
intentional
movements of [one’s own body] . . . and the outwardly
perceived movements and positions of an external body
. . . .”90 “[Trial] courts provide the primary, or perhaps the
sole, opportunity for personal interaction between . . .
litigants and the judges who will decide their cases.
Empathetic engagement in this context plays an essential
role: it both informs the judge and reassures the litigant.”91
But this sort of interaction simply can’t be experienced on
Zoom. The judge’s and jurors’ own bodies, of which each is
kinesthetically aware, remain in their respective homes or
89. Norm Friesen, Telepresence and Tele-absence: A Phenomenology of the
(In)visible Alien Online, 8 PHENOMENOLOGY & PRAC. 17, 23–25 (2014); see also
supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text. Computer scientist Jaron Lanier said
all of this clearly some time ago:
Human interaction has both verbal and nonverbal elements, and
videoconferencing seems precisely configured to confound the nonverbal
ones. It is impossible to make eye contact properly, for instance, in
today’s videoconferencing systems, because the camera and the display
screen cannot be in the same spot. This usually leads to a deadened and
formal affect in interactions, eye contact being a nearly ubiquitous
subconscious method of affirming trust.
Jaron Lanier, Virtually There, 284 SCI. AM. 66, 68 (2001). Despite improvements
in videoconferencing technology in the last twenty years, the observation still
holds true.
90. Iso Kern, Intersubjectivity, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHENOMENOLOGY 355, 357
(Lester Embree et al. eds., 1997) (discussing Edmund Husserl).
91. Susan A. Bandes, Empathy and Article III: Judge Weinstein, Cases and
Controversies, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 317, 325 (2015) [hereinafter Bandes, Empathy
and Article III].
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offices; the parties’ heads and shoulders appear in little boxes
on computer screens. We have already noted the
dehumanization or depersonalization of the remote
defendant who appears for bail or sentencing via
videoconferencing,92 but the absence of physical co-presence
could undermine decision-makers’ ability to empathize with
any other participant,93 and even when everyone appears
remotely, via the same interface.
Concerns and Next Steps
If our legal culture continues to privilege physical
courtrooms for the demeanor evidence they afford, and views
virtual courts with suspicion until they can yield equivalent
displays, it ought to be on a firmer basis than a mystical faith
in the “elusive and incommunicable imponderable” nature of
demeanor
evidence.94
As
mentioned
above,
the
overwhelming weight of social science research debunks the
common-sense belief that demeanor is a reliable cue to
credibility. No comparable body of research establishes that
demeanor is a flawed guide to others’ character, largely
because the ground truth of the matter is harder to pin down,
but even in the unlikely event courts could assess “deep
character,” there is a real question whether they ought to be
in the business of doing so, and of assigning consequences
based on these assessments.95
Making demeanor evidence available and enabling
decision-makers to take it into account might still be deemed
worthwhile because it is believed to serve the core
adjudication values of dignity and fairness: as a basic feature
of their personhood, litigants deserve to be seen and heard

92. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
93. See Emma Rowden, Distributed Courts and Legitimacy: What Do We Lose
When We Lose the Courthouse?, 14 LAW, CULTURE, & HUMAN. 263, 271–74 (2018).
94. Bandes, Remorse, Demeanor, and Consequences, supra note 12, at 172.
95. See Murphy, supra note 24, at 437.
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by those who will pass judgment on them,96 and they deserve
to have their judge or jurors see, hear, and evaluate in real
time the witnesses who provide the evidence on which they
will be judged.97 If demeanor evidence is therefore still
valued but its flaws are underscored and even exacerbated
on Zoom, then perhaps the experience of virtual courts
should hasten the implementation of reforms so that
demeanor will be used more judiciously. At least one federal
judge, for instance, employs revised jury instructions that
make explicit some popular misconceptions about what
certain demeanors signify.98 These could be adapted for use
in virtual courtrooms, calling attention to specific ways that
the videoconferencing interface may distort perceptions and
interpretations of demeanor. In experimental research,
cautionary instructions have been found to limit the impact
of the camera perspective bias, the otherwise robust effect of
the angle from which a suspect’s videotaped confession is
shot on viewer’s judgments of whether the confession was
voluntary and whether the suspect is guilty.99 Similar
96. See Bandes, Empathy and Article III, supra note 91.
97. This seems to be the thinking behind the position taken by federal courts
that under Fed. R. Crim. P. 43, a criminal defendant must be physically present
in the courtroom during his sentencing even if he consents to appear virtually.
These courts have reasoned in part that:
“[b]eing physically present in the same room with another has certain
intangible and difficult to articulate effects that are wholly absent when
communicating by video conference.” . . . .
. . . A “face-to-face meeting between the defendant and the judge
permits the judge to experience ‘those impressions gleaned through . . .
any personal confrontation in which one attempts to assess the
credibility or to evaluate the true moral fiber of another.’”
United States v. Bethea, 888 F.3d 864, 867 (7th Cir. 2018) (internal citations
omitted). Even though the CARES Act allows federal judges to proceed with
virtual sentencing under certain conditions, they have generally declined to do so
for other than time-served sentences. See, e.g., United States v. Fagan, No. 2:19cr-123-DBH, 2020 WL 2850225 (D. Me. June 6, 2020).
98. Bennett, supra note 13, at 63.
99. See Jennifer K. Elek et al., Knowing When the Camera Lies: Judicial
Instructions Mitigate the Camera Perspective Bias, 17 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL
PSYCHOL. 123, 124, 129–31 (2012).
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instructions, assuming they are adequately supported by
additional, ecologically valid research, could speak to the
biases introduced or exacerbated when witnesses and parties
speak into their laptop or tablet cameras. Some courts have
already begun adopting the practice of providing common
virtual backgrounds for all participants100 to eliminate both
visual distractions and disparities among witnesses and
parties,101 which (as we’ve seen) can also affect assessments
of demeanor.
The inadequacies of access to demeanor evidence and the
biases likely to result from resorting to it in virtual
proceedings could, on the other hand, lead us to question
whether the game is worth the candle. As already pointed
out, judgmental accuracy is not served if decision-makers
routinely gauge witnesses’ credibility on the basis of
misleading and biased cues. In addition, fairness and dignity
for parties are poorly served if judges and jurors
systematically misconstrue parties’ demeanors based on
stereotyped assumptions and prejudices.102 Conversely,
some drawbacks of demeanor evidence in traditional
courtrooms are highlighted by what virtual courts leave out.
Witnesses may testify less confidently without the physical
presence of family or friends in the public gallery, but (as
discussed in Part III below) the absence of a visible public
from the Zoom hearing or trial also means that witnesses in
an excessive force case won’t be intimidated by the blue wall
of officers staring them down.103 In a homicide case in a
virtual courtroom, jurors won’t be susceptible to prejudice
from the presence of the victim’s family members wearing

100. See Griffin v. Albanese Enterprise, Inc., No. 16-2019-CA-1555 (Fla. Cir.
Ct., August 10, 2020) for an example of a court adopting this practice.
101. See, e.g., Turner, supra note 22 at 59 (reporting that defense attorneys
surveyed expressed significant concerns about their cleints’ difficulties with
access to technology).
102. See supra notes 41–47 and accompanying text.
103. See “sea of blue” discussion, infra note 203 and accompanying text.
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buttons featuring the victim’s picture.104 And whether in
physical or virtual court, judges and jurors who lack
demeanor evidence will still be able to hear the parties’
stories, which can generate the empathy that is so important
to litigants’ sense of dignity and decision-makers’ own wellinformed judgments.105
We have argued for a more intentional approach to
examining how live testimony in open courts advances
cherished values like fairness, accuracy, and transparency,
in order to determine how those values can be best retained
when open trials are under threat or impossible. It is
important to note a caveat. These values have always been
weighed against countervailing interests such as privacy,
security, and efficiency. Just as some may be tempted to try
to unthinkingly recreate traditional arrangements, there is
a converse temptation, already evident, to prize efficiency too
highly. For example, four months into the current pandemic,
the chief justice of the Texas Supreme Court and co-chair of
the National Center for State Courts’ pandemic rapid
response team stated, “we’re going to be doing court business
remotely forever. This has changed the world.” Virtual court
proceedings have been lauded as making “depositions, oral
arguments, and jury selection much more efficient.”106
Efficiency matters, but it can easily subsume other values at
the heart of the justice system.
If virtual proceedings lead to the conclusion that reliance
on demeanor evidence should be minimized, a different, more
radical set of reforms would be in order. For instance, it has
been argued that even in physical courtrooms, witnesses
should testify behind screens, visible only in silhouette, to
104. See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006).
105. See, e.g., FEIGENSON, supra note 27, at 121–24; Bandes, Remorse,
Demeanor, and Consequences, supra note 12.
106. Allie Reed & Madison Alder, Zoom Courts Will Stick Around as Virus
Forces Seismic Change, BLOOMBERG LAW, (July 30, 2020, 4:50 AM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/zoom-courts-will-stick-around-asvirus-forces-seismic-change.

1310

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

reduce the effect of jurors’ racial biases on their assessment
of witnesses’ credibility.107 Extending this idea to virtual
courts, videoconferencing interfaces could include filters to
obscure witnesses’ facial expressions and upper-body
postures. It seems more problematic to extend this to parties;
after all, if trying cases on Zoom reduces judges’ and jurors’
capacity for empathizing with parties, it would seem that
taking away most of whatever diminished sense of copresence is felt would even more strongly undermine the
multiple core values of adjudication that empathy serves:
inclusivity, dignity, fairness, and accuracy.108
There is much to be learned about how virtual
proceedings affect the presentation and interpretation of
demeanor evidence. Perhaps more to the point, there is still
a vast amount to be learned about the presentation and
interpretation of demeanor evidence in traditional
courtrooms. For a central, largely unquestioned tenet of the
common-law system, and one that exercises enormous
influence over decisions about property, liberty, and even
life, demeanor evidence has been resting on its laurels for far
too long.

107. Chet K.W. Pager, Blind Justice, Colored Truths and the Veil of Ignorance,
41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 373 (2005); see also Stanley P. Williams Jr., Double-Blind
Justice: A Scientific Solution to Criminal Bias in the Courtroom, 6 IND. J.L. &
SOC. EQUALITY 48 (2018) (recommending that to avoid racial bias, defendant not
be visible to jurors).
108. The absence of physical co-presence in virtual courts also prevents
arguably inappropriate demonstrations of empathy, such as Texas Judge Tammy
Kemp’s return to the courtroom after the murder conviction of white ex-police
office Amber Guyger, who was found guilty for fatally shooting an innocent black
man, Botham Jean, in his own apartment, to hug Guyger (and give her a Bible).
Sarah Mervosh & Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, Amber Guyger’s Judge Gave Her a
Bible and a Hug. Did That Cross a Line?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/04/us/amber-guyger-judge-tammy-kemphug.html. For that matter, it prevents inappropriate expressions of anger as well,
such as the courtroom assault on Larry Nassar by the father of one of his victims.
See infra note 257 and accompanying text.
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II. THE COURTROOM AS A SITE OF JUSTICE
Since at least the time of Homer, authoritative justice
has been performed at a “proclaimed place” known to the
entire community.109 This may have been outside, like the
stones on which the judges depicted on Achilles’ shield in the
Iliad sat110 or the trees under which South African
community tribunals were traditionally convened,111 or
inside, often in buildings also used for other governmental
business.112 The location need not be fixed: Assize hearings
were held peripatetically in England for eight centuries,
ending only 50 years ago;113 the Australian Federal Court set
up shop in the remote Great Victoria Desert to give its
imprimatur to an Aboriginal land claims settlement.114 The
contemporary expectation in Anglo-American legal culture,
however, shaped by the dominant practice since the late 18th
and especially the 19th century, is that trials take place in
courtrooms designed for adjudication, located within a public
building, a courthouse, primarily dedicated to that same
purpose.115
What basic values are served by insisting that
adjudication be conducted in courtrooms inside courthouses?
In principle, it serves every value we’ve identified. Holding
hearings and trials at a publicly known and accessible venue
promotes inclusiveness. The nobility and often grandeur of
109. Richard Mohr, In Between: Power and Procedure Where the Court Meets
the Public Sphere, in A THOUSAND EYES: MEDIA TECHNOLOGY, LAW AND
AESTHETICS 99 (Marit Paasche & Judy Radul, eds., 2011) (quoting District Court
Act 1973 (NSW) No 9 div 4 18F (Austl.)).
110. Raymond Westbrook, The Trial Scene in the Iliad, 94 HARV. STUD.
CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY 53 (1992).
111. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 3, at 351.
112. See LINDA MULCAHY, LEGAL ARCHITECTURE 24–27 (2011).
113. Although at each location the judges’ arrival and attendance at the local
site of justice were accompanied by great ceremony. LINDA MULCAHY & EMMA
ROWDEN, THE DEMOCRATIC COURTHOUSE 49–50 (2020).
114. See RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 3, at 366–72.
115. MULCAHY, supra note 112, at 31.

1312

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

the courthouse and the courtrooms within it reaffirm the
authority of the state and the centrality of adjudication to
good government while simultaneously recognizing every
litigant and witness as worthy of equal dignity and
respect.116 A courtroom designed to provide clear sight lines
among all the participants and to make each one’s speech
clearly audible throughout the room enhances the fairness of
the proceedings and the accuracy of the resulting judgment.
And, to the extent that testimony, other evidence, and
argument are also plainly visible and audible to members of
the public and press, the courtroom promotes transparency.
In practice, of course, courtrooms in courthouses may fail
to achieve some or all of these goals. Much adjudicatory
business is done in unprepossessing rooms that convey little
sense of dignity or state authority.117 Antiquated facilities
and overcrowding can make showing up for court an
oppressive experience. The interiors of courthouse buildings
are often designed to ensure the efficiency and privacy of
judges’ and lawyers’ offstage work but at the cost of baffling
and disorienting lay participants and their families.118 Poor
acoustics in the courtroom or street noises intruding from
outside can distract participants, making it harder for
parties, lawyers, judges, and jurors to attend to the
testimony and argument on which the decision will be
based.119 In England and Australia, although not the United
States, courtrooms are configured as if to stigmatize criminal
defendants by placing them in a dock, isolated from the other
participants. The perceived need for greater security in
recent years has worsened the problem: docks are now
enclosed behind Plexiglas shields, impairing defendants’
ability to see and hear, and to be seen and heard, including

116. See Rowden, supra note 93, at 265–66.
117. See RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 3, at 317.
118. See MULCAHY, supra note 112, at 88–97.
119. MULCAHY & ROWDEN, supra note 113, at 15.
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by their own counsel.120
Consider some benefits of moving proceedings online.
Permitting laypeople to conduct legal business via
videoconference from their own homes makes participation
in the justice system less burdensome and more inclusive.121
Civil and family court litigants don’t have to travel to the
courthouse, navigate their way to the proper room, and wait
perhaps several hours for their cases to be called, at the cost
of forgoing work and arranging for child care (if doing either
is even possible for them);122 they can simply log on to the
court’s video platform from their smartphone or tablet and
follow the instructions.123 Inclusiveness and dignity may also
be enhanced during the virtual proceeding to the extent that
litigants and witnesses, especially vulnerable ones, feel less
intimidated appearing and testifying from their own homes
than when forced to enter formidable buildings, filled with
officials enforcing opaque and byzantine rules, and then
speak in the physical presence of an imposing judge sitting
on high.124
Online adjudication—part of a broader trend, predating

120. See id. at 284–98.
121. See Jane Donoghue, The Rise of Digital Justice: Courtroom Technology,
Public Participation and Access to Justice, 80 MOD. L. REV. 995 (2017).
122. For one affecting example of the burdens of going to court, see DAVID
FEIGE, INDEFENSIBLE: ONE LAWYER’S JOURNEY INTO THE INFERNO OF AMERICAN
JUSTICE at 127–135 (2006) (account of a young man arrested for walking a friend’s
dog without carrying vaccination papers, leading to days in jail and the loss of his
job as he unsuccessfully attempted to obtain a trial to establish his innocence);
see also Jennifer Gonnerman, Before the Law, NEW YORKER, Oct. 6, 2014 (“A boy
was accused of taking a backpack. The courts took the next three years of his
life.”).
123. E.g., Press Release, Her Majesty’s Courts & Tribunals Serv., New Video
Tech to Increase Remote Hearings in Civil and Family Courts (July 1, 2020),
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-video-tech-to-increase-remotehearings-in-civil-and-family-courts.
124. See Linda Mulcahy, The Unbearable Lightness of Being? Shifts Towards
the Virtual Trial, 35 J.L. & SOC’Y 464 (2008); Rowden, supra note 93; Meredith
Rossner & Martha McCurdy, Implementing Video Hearings (Party-to-State): A
Process Evaluation, U.K. MINISTRY JUST. (2018).
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the coronavirus pandemic, toward digitizing justice
systems125—can also be more efficient than requiring
hearings and trials to be conducted entirely in physical
courtrooms. Lawyers can get their work done instead of
spending hours driving to and from distant county
courthouses.126 Evidentiary hearings and trials need not be
delayed because remotely located witnesses, attorneys,
interpreters, or other key participants cannot get to court on
schedule.127 Judges in criminal courts are able to process
more arraignments and bail hearings when the defendants
need not be transported from jail and shuttled into and out
of the courtrooms.128 Moreover, the security concerns
involved in transporting those defendants and placing them
in a physical courtroom are obviated when the prisoners do
not need to leave jail to appear.129
That something so utterly different in look, sound, and
feel as a meeting on Zoom is now widely accepted as
adjudication, though, directs our attention to an ineffable
quality of courtrooms that these enumerations of pros and
cons don’t quite explain. In Part III we will explore the
complex roles of the public in (and outside of) the courtroom.
Here we focus on two aspects of the hallowed tradition of
adjudicating in a special kind of place. First, those who
participate in proceedings in dedicated, culturally resonant
125. See, e.g., RICHARD SUSSKIND, ONLINE COURTS AND THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE
(2019).
126. Reed & Alder, supra note 106.
127. Gourdet et al., supra note 48, at 11.
128. Robin Davis et al., Research on Videoconferencing at Post-Arraignment
Release Hearings: Phase I Final Report, ICF INT’L 4, 28 (2015); Anne Bowen
Poulin, Criminal Justice and Videoconferencing Technology: The Remote
Defendant, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1091, 1094 (2004).
129. Gourdet et al., supra note 48, at 4. Of course, the technology must be
working properly and all participants properly prepared to use it in order to
realize the benefits of virtual adjudication. Often this is not the case, whether
because of deficiencies in infrastructure, preparation for the hearing, or
monitoring during the proceedings. See, e.g., id. at 13–16; Linda Mulcahy et al.,
Exploring the Case for Virtual Jury Trials During the COVID-19 Crisis, U.K.
MINISTRY JUST. (2020); Rossner & McCurdy, supra note 124.
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courtrooms may find those proceedings more authentic and
legitimate than those conducted virtually because they are
more likely to feel engaged in something personally
significant. Second, the configuration of the courtroom as a
stage shapes and structures the emotional interactions of
trial participants and thus informs the judgments of
decision-makers. For each aspect, we explore what is lost and
what is gained in the move from physical courtrooms to
virtual ones, and why it matters.
The Courtroom as a Place
Several features of the traditional courtroom tend to
make the experience of going to court feel out of the ordinary,
even momentous. As we’ve noted, courtrooms in courthouses
are discrete physical places dedicated to a particular kind of
activity. For most litigants and witnesses, going to court
takes them outside their daily routines and into a separate
environment that, by its distinctive location (as well as its
symbolism, to be discussed in a moment), signals that they
will be engaged in a special, culturally acknowledged kind of
activity requiring appropriate behaviors.130 The courtroom,
along with the courthouse of which it is a part, also endures
in time. The physical reality of the building and the
courtroom binds each litigant’s experience not only to the
experiences of their contemporaries but to the community’s
ongoing legal tradition.131 The performance of a structured,
socially significant activity in a special, enduring place of its
own, removed from quotidian space and time, is the essence
of communal ritual. Courthouses and courtrooms imagined
as “temples of justice” carry precisely this connotation.132
130. Rowden, supra note 93, at 274.
131. See id. at 275–77.
132. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 3, at 137. Conducting adjudication in these
dedicated, quasi-sacred sites is as central to the maintenance of the community’s
nomos as the narratives the community tells about itself in its foundational legal
documents. See generally Robert Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV.
4 (1983). This continuity of the place of justice through time is perhaps especially
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In addition, the architecture of the traditional
courthouse and the symbolism of its interior design,
decorations, and statuary reinforce participants’ sense that
they have entered a special place to engage in a special sort
of activity. “Architecture marks off and signifies that
authority-to-judge which can only be found inside a court of
law and nowhere else; it assigns legal discourse to a proper
place.”133 Courthouses and courtrooms throughout Western
history have employed a variety of iconography to convey
each society’s vision of how justice should be performed and
what goals it should strive to achieve; in modern
democracies, these goals have tended to converge on
“independent decisionmakers, requirements of public
processes, a new ideal of fairness, and equal access for and
equal treatment of all,”134 represented by a female figure of
Justice (sometimes blindfolded, sometimes not) holding
scales and a sword.135 Governmental flags and seals, as well
as the generally imposing structure of the building and often
the major courtrooms themselves, also signal the authority
of the state. The architecture and symbolism of the
courtroom and courthouse encourage those who enter to
perform their roles in the hearing or trial with an attitude of
formality, respect, and seriousness.136
Things are different on Zoom. There is no imposing
building or formal room; lay participants sit in the same
rooms in their homes or offices in which they conduct many
of their daily routines.137 There is no sense of entering
important in common-law countries whose judge-made doctrine depends on the
principles of precedent and stare decisis.
133. Mohr, supra note 109, at 107 (quoting Piyel Haldar, In and Out of Court:
On Topographies of Law and the Architecture of Court Buildings, 7 INT’L J. FOR
SEMIOTICS L. 185 (1994)).
134. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 3, at 15.
135. See id. at 1–139.
136. Rowden, supra note 93, at 275–76.
137. Or they may appear from often unprepossessing video rooms in
courthouses or other locations. MULCAHY, supra note 112, at 171–72; ROWDEN ET
AL., supra note 48.
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(crossing the threshold to) a special place. Indeed, the virtual
courtroom is in no particular place at all, visible only as an
interface on the computer screens of participants—the same
sort of interface participants use for socializing with friends
and family or meeting with colleagues, which itself is on the
same laptop or tablet they use for checking their e-mails and
the news, shopping, and watching videos. Nor does the
virtual courtroom extend in time. Traditional courthouses
and courtrooms were there before the participants arrived
and will be there after they leave; the buildings may be
decades or centuries old and are built of materials made to
last well into the future. Courtrooms and courthouses, like
people and communities, have histories. Videoconferencing
sessions do not. The virtual court is entirely ephemeral,
called into being for each hearing and disappearing at its end
with a tap on a keypad. As one legal videographer puts it:
“Unless you hit ‘record,’ Zoom is vapor.”138
Participation in proceedings in a traditional courtroom,
in contrast to videoconferencing, makes people, especially lay
participants who are not repeat players, feel that they have
engaged in something eventful. This effect is due in part to
the difference between direct and mediated experience.
Direct experiences, which afford presence and, if social, copresence, are generally richer than mediated or vicarious
ones. People who have had a particular experience can
remember and imagine it viscerally in ways that those
lacking that experience cannot.139 This stronger hold on
consciousness means that, all things being equal,
participation in a hearing or trial in a physical courtroom will
feel more significant. Just as important, the distinctiveness
of the site of adjudication, its continuity in time, and the
symbolism of the building and the room elevate the personal
significance of the events that take place there by connecting

138. Interview with Cathie Reese, President, Geomatrix Prod. (July 15, 2020).
139. David Lewis, What Experience Teaches, in THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS
579, 579 (Ned Block et al. eds., 1997).
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each participant to a location, a time span, and a society that
are larger than the individual.140
In contrast, remote participation, lacking bodily copresence and engagement, can feel “depersonalized” and
“less humane.”141 Tiana Clark, a woman who recently got
divorced on Zoom, wrote that what should have been a
momentous experience seemed not fully real:
My virtual divorce felt dreamlike — weeks later, I sometimes
wonder whether it really happened. So much of dreaming feels like
you’re trying to grab the hem of something that dissipates right in
front of you. Videoconferencing has the same effect, inducing an
exhausting sense of placelessness. . . . .
....
. . . [Despite the procedure’s legal efficacy], I still felt like I missed
something.142

Virtual court participants’ sense of presence can never
be grounded in a unique place; it is always divided between
being “in” the interface and observing it, as spectator or
audience, from their homes or offices. This sense of dual
presence has been extensively theorized in writings on film
and media studies.143 The gist for our purposes is that the
participant who is simultaneously an observer cannot feel as
engaged in a videoconferenced proceeding as she would when
her consciousness is not thus divided.144

140. See generally Rowden, supra note 93. Because “individuals and traditions,
psyches and cultures, make each other up,” RICHARD SHWEDER, THINKING
THROUGH CULTURES 2 (1991), enlarging the social and cultural context in which
a person acts and interacts can enlarge the person’s sense of self as well.
141. Rowden, supra note 93, at 272–73.
142. Tiana Clark, The Surreal Anticlimax of Getting Divorced over
Videoconference, WASH. POST (June 23, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
outlook/2020/06/23/surreal-anticlimax-getting-divorced-over-videoconference/.
143. E.g., ANNE FRIEDBERG, THE VIRTUAL WINDOW (2006).
144. Furthermore, the point of view that each participant has of the interface,
seeing all other participants (focally or somewhat peripherally) at once without
moving her head, is a view that she cannot possibly have in the physical
courtroom. Cf. Judy Radul, Video Chamber, in A THOUSAND EYES: MEDIA
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This sense of inconsequentiality can also be traced to the
eliding of “the distinction between inside and outside, the
very distinction that is most essential to the [adjudicatory]
performance.”145 The litigant in virtual court is not
physically, kinesthetically inside a special place; she remains
in her home or office, while the proceedings take place
nowhere in particular (from one perspective, they are
distributed among the various physical locations in which all
of the respective participants sit; from another, they take
place in the cloud). Virtual proceedings feel less momentous
because participants do not go to, enter, and then return
from the community’s distinctive space dedicated to
adjudication.146
Why should this matter? Ms. Clark got her divorce; other
litigants will have their contracts enforced or not, offenders
will be sentenced, witnesses will say their piece, and courts
will work through their dockets. What of any real importance
is missing? The substantiality of the courtroom in the
courthouse, the formality that the configuration of the room
encourages, and the state authority that the building’s and
room’s symbolism convey all tend to make participants in
proceedings feel that they have had the opportunity to be
heard. They feel this not just in a technical legal sense but in
a way that is vivid, dignified, and resonant. They are more

TECHNOLOGY, LAW AND AESTHETICS, supra note 109, at 117, 122–25. As a
consequence, her visual awareness of the proceedings is disembodied, further
removing it from her everyday phenomenal consciousness and thus making it
seem “dreamlike,” “placeless,” and less real.
145. Cornelia Vismann, Tele-Tribunals: Anatomy of a Medium, in A THOUSAND
EYES: MEDIA TECHNOLOGY, LAW AND AESTHETICS, supra note 109, at 81, 83.
146. See Mulcahy, supra note 124, at 480 (“It would seem, then, that live link
[i.e., participation via video] has the potential to place key actors in the trial
outside of the great temples to law that have become synonymous with statesanctioned adjudication in our cityscapes, and replace them with the mundane
. . . . Live-link witnesses remain unaffected by the influence of court architecture
or ornament. The ritual of a journey to the court and away from it are denied
them. The court enters their space at the will of a technician and just as easily
vacates it. Law comes, it goes, but it is constantly elsewhere.” (emphasis added)).
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likely to feel that they have had their “justice moment.”147
Crime victims, for instance (as we will discuss in Part III),
often place great weight on being heard “officially.” This
sense of officiality comes from participating in a hearing not
only in front of a judge as representative of the judicial
system, but also in a physical space whose heft and
permanence reflect the weight and authority of the law. The
opportunity to be heard matters to people’s sense of
procedural justice,148 and hence their belief that they have
been treated fairly. This implication of adjudication in a
physical courtroom serves the core value of fairness as well
as dignity.149 It remains to be seen whether a witness
appearing only as a talking head on Zoom, in a virtual
courtroom that disappears when the hearing ends,
experiences the same sense of being heard and recognized.
We suspect, however, that this sense of seriousness and
shared purpose may be shortchanged as judges, court
administrators, and some lawyers emphasize the efficiency
of virtual proceedings.150

147. Hazel Genn, Professor, Univ. Coll. London, Online Courts and the Future
of Justice, Address at the Birkenhead Annual Lecture 12 (Oct. 16, 2017),
https://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/sites/laws/files/birkenhead_lecture_2017_professor_
dame_hazel_genn_final_version.pdf.
148. E.g., Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom Tyler, Procedural Justice and the
Rule of Law: Fostering Legitimacy in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1 J. DISP.
RESOL. 1, 4–5 (2011).
149. At the extreme, litigants who feel that appearing virtually does not afford
them their “justice moment” may disengage from the process, failing to pursue
their rights as vigorously as those who get to appear in person. See Eagly, supra
note 48, at 1000.
150. See Reed & Alder, supra note 106; see also Broward County (FL) Circuit
Court Judge, Jack Tuter, remarking on the large number of hearings already
conducted on Zoom by late April 2020, while the news report containing his
remarks shows as b-roll several of the problems (small image frames, shifting
arrays, defendants appearing from stigmatizing remote environments) we’ve
noted in this Article, the producers possibly being unaware that the juxtaposition
of this footage with the judge’s words could be problematic in any way. WPLG,
After Nearly 2,000 Virtual Hearings, Broward Courts ‘Pleased’ with Zoom
Platform, YOUTUBE (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
S8VexjxOgVU.
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To some extent, the sense of speaking and being heard at
the site of justice may be replicated in virtual courts. For
instance, online platforms can be designed to evoke some
sense of the “journey to the courtroom”—the transition of
going from one’s daily life to the court. Such design
innovations may help prompt some awareness of state
authority,151 which may deepen participants’ sense of the
gravitas and hence the eventfulness of the proceedings.
“[J]udges [will also have to] make more explicit efforts to
compensate for the absence of the usual affordances and cues
provided by the physical courtroom in order to assist the
remote participant to effectively ‘enter’ and remain in the
court space.”152 By explaining to litigants and witnesses who
are not repeat players how the proceedings will unfold, what
the role of each person on the screen is, and how everyone is
expected to behave, judges can help impress upon
participants the significance of the occasion. Technological
advances are also likely to improve participants’ sense of
presence and co-presence in virtual courts, offering an
experience a little closer to that of the physical courtroom.153
Moreover, it’s possible that as people become increasingly
accustomed to videoconferencing in their everyday lives, they
will be less likely to devalue virtual interactions relative to
in-person, face-to-face ones, and thus less likely to feel that
online proceedings are somehow “unreal.”154
The current world-wide experiment with virtual
proceedings also suggests how the experience of justice in
151. Rossner, supra note 87.
152. Emma Rowden & Anne Wallace, Remote Judging: The Impact of Video
Links on the Image and the Role of the Judge, 14 INT’L J. L. CONTEXT 504, 521
(2018); see also Mulcahy et al., supra note 129.
153. TAIT ET AL., supra note 48.
154. See Clark, supra note 142. In response, some might contend that this sort
of adaptation would reflect merely that in an increasingly online and networked
society, people are resigning themselves to diminished interactions with others.
SHERRY TURKLE, ALONE TOGETHER: WHY WE EXPECT MORE FROM TECHNOLOGY AND
LESS FROM EACH OTHER (1st ed. 2011); see also JARON LANIER, YOU ARE NOT A
GADGET (paperback ed. 2011).
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physical courtrooms might be enhanced. The ease of getting
to the online courtroom (when the technology is working
properly) underscores the need to (re)design courthouses so
that lay participants can find their way around and feel as
comfortable as possible while waiting for their cases to be
called.155 Judges in physical courtrooms should not assume
that litigants and witnesses will somehow absorb from the
imposing surroundings an understanding of what’s expected
of them; rather, lay participants should be provided with
more of the explicit guidance that is being recommended for
virtual courts.156 The obstacles to mutual visibility and
audibility that frequently arise on Zoom should redirect
attention to the fact that participants sometimes can’t see or
hear each other clearly enough in physical courtrooms either,
encouraging court administration, judges, and staff to do
what they can (within their limited resources) to address
these problems. Our nascent experience with virtual courts
underscores how the “day in court” as a physical
phenomenon is typically discussed with reverence, but often
without necessary attention to the practical steps needed to
promote the inclusivity, transparency, and other values that
make participating in adjudication so legally and culturally
resonant.
The Courtroom as Theater Space
The physical courtroom plays yet another powerful but
often unarticulated role: It helps shape and channel the
emotions the participants display. The configuration of the
courtroom is important. “The specific place . . . which is

155. See, e.g., MULCAHY & ROWDEN, supra note 113, at 326–27.
156. We might take a cue from Swedish courts, in each of which the visitor
encounters a welcome booth near the entrance, staffed by a friendly person who
explains the configuration of the courthouse and the courtroom, provides multilingual informational brochures, and offers to accompany the lay visitor to the
courtroom to provide emotional support. See, e.g., Sveriges Domstolar (last
modified Sept. 9, 2014) (Swed.), http://old.domstol.se/Funktioner/English/Legalproceedings/To-witnesses/.
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allocated to each participant (prosecution, defense, witness,
judge) promotes the coherence of that complex and very
sophisticated unity which is the trial.”157 “In court, where you
are is who you are.”158 Judges have long been ensconced on
raised platforms, front and center, often in rather grand
chairs, in front of or flanked by symbols of the state and the
court, indicating their authority over the proceedings and
facilitating their exercise of it.159 Increasingly since the 19th
century, courtrooms have been further partitioned so that
each participant (litigant, lawyer, witness, juror) is limited
to a certain location and must speak, if at all, from that
position,160 while leaving room, generally at the back, for
members of the press and the public. That some participants
can be seen entering to take their positions (the judge
entering from behind the bench and sitting down, the
witness walking to the stand), while attorneys, at least, have
greater freedom of movement within the well of the
courtroom and try to use it to their rhetorical advantage,
highlights certain moments in the proceedings and draws
attention to them.161 The blocking of the courtroom stage
helps structure the often fragmented discourses of the
evidentiary hearing or trial into a sequence of dialogic
exchanges, or, at any rate, speech directed toward specific
other people in the courtroom but with the awareness that
there is an audience.162 Everyone understands at each

157. Mohr, supra note 109, at 108.
158. Radul, supra note 144, at 119.
159. Even in those newer courtrooms in which the layout is less hierarchical—
the bench may be at the same level as the tables at which counsel and litigants
sit, or the furniture may be arranged in a circle—the judge’s position tends to be
singled out. See, e.g., MULCAHY & ROWDEN, supra note 113, at 243.
160. E.g., MULCAHY, supra note 112, at 43–53.
161. FERGUSON, supra note 10, at 70–71. This is somewhat analogous to how
camera movement and editing enable movies to function as “attentional engines,”
concentrating the audience’s focus on important moments in the drama. Carroll
& Seeley, supra note 68, at 62.
162. Thus, the lawyer conducting direct or cross-examination speaks to the
witness, but so that the judge and jury can hear; the witness may respond to the
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moment who is addressing whom, and all can know as they
speak that other participants and members of the public are
watching and listening, gauging their “interactional
competence.”163
All of the participants, moreover, are present in the
space of the courtroom and therefore physically co-present
with one another. The physical distance between different
pairs or groups of participants varies; the witness may be
seated far enough from the jurors that they can’t hear her
clearly unless she remembers to speak into the microphone,
whereas the jurors themselves are seated closely enough to
each other that they may be able to sense from their
neighbors’ postures, glimpsed in their peripheral vision, who
is paying attention to the testimony and who is drifting off.
But all participants are, and know that they are, in a shared
physical space. When a prosecutor asks a witness if she sees
the perpetrator in the courtroom and the witness points
toward the defendant, everyone can follow her gesture (even
though the prosecutor, to create a good record, will add, “Let
the record show that the witness pointed at the defendant”).
When a lawyer holds up an item of physical evidence or
directs everyone’s attention to a photograph shown on a large
courtroom screen, all heads and eyes tend to turn in the same
direction. These and other instances of the “synchronization
of mutual attention” feed the shared sense of co-presence.164
Co-presence extends to the jury room: jurors who have
observed the witnesses and the parties together over the
course of the trial then deliberate in a common space, where
their ability to interact face-to-face, orienting their bodies
toward and away from each other and following each other’s

lawyer or also, by turns, to the judge and/or jury; lawyers address the judge with
objections; the judge responds to them with her rulings; the judge delivers her
instructions to the jury, and so on.
163. Christian Licoppe, Video Communication and ‘Camera Actions’: The
Production of Wide Video Shots in Courtrooms with Remote Defendants, 76 J.
PRAGMATICS 117, 119, 132 (2015).
164. Campos-Castillo & Hitlin, supra note 87, at 171.
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gestures, facilitates mutual feedback165 and can increase
their mutual trust.166
Once again, things are different on Zoom. Within the
interface, the locations and sizes of the boxes in which each
participant appears on “gallery view” may or may not evoke
the hierarchy of roles in the physical courtroom, with the
judge clearly in the command position (say, at the top and
center of the array). But the array may be unstable, changing
whenever a participant is added or dropped or, in speaker
view, whenever someone else begins to speak.167 This
undermines any impression of formal hierarchy, even though
the participants are individually identifiable by the small
labels Zoom places within each box, aided by introductions
made by the conscientious judge. At the same time, the
visibility of each participant’s home or office environment
can exert a distracting centrifugal force, fragmenting the
virtual courtroom into a mere juxtaposition of personal
settings filled with window treatments, bookshelves, and
tchotchkes.168 There is of course no bodily co-presence.
Participants do not share an actual common space; the
relationships between their images on the screen have no
165. ERVING GOFFMAN, BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC PLACES (1963).
166. See NGUYEN & CANNY, MULTIVIEW, supra note 49.
167. The convener may stabilize the array somewhat by “pinning” the video
showing a given participant. But unless the convener of the Zoom meeting
chooses the proper settings, each participant may also change his or her view of
the interface at will, toggling between speaker and gallery view. And regardless
of the control the convener exercises over the interface, each participant or other
viewer may adjust the size of the interface on his or her laptop or other screen,
changing the size and reconfiguring the arrangement of the boxes in which
participants appear.
168. The injection of this sort of individual informality into the space of
adjudication is not unprecedented. For instance, Resnik and Curtis discuss the
informality of courtrooms in 17th century Netherlands and temporary justice sites
in modern Western Australia, which have included onlookers, dogs, and so on.
RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 3, at 367–72. The personal environments visible on
Zoom strike us as anomalous in contrast to the more regimented formality of
20th–21st century courts in the United States and England. The other examples,
though, suggest that not all of the trappings of what we take to be the traditional
courtroom are necessary to what we might deem to be proper adjudication.
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connection to the relationships their bodies would have to
one another in a real physical room. Among other things, this
makes it impossible to determine from the positions of
interlocutors’ bodies and the directions of their heads and
eyes who is speaking to whom. And because there is no
courtroom gallery, participants remain unaware of any
audience beyond the array of heads and torsos on the
interface.
In contrast, the physical courtroom’s “large room with
space for an audience, exaggerated demarcations and
enlarged spatial distances between players prescribe a
public persona.”169 More specifically, the configuration of the
physical courtroom and the actual or at least implied
presence of an audience tends to make participants more
aware than they generally are in daily life that they are
engaged in a performance.170 This heightens the sense of the
gravity of their choice of words and expressions, and their
interchanges with others. Law’s abiding faith in the power of
words may incline people to think that verbal content alone,
ultimately reduced to words on pages, is sufficient for
adjudication. Yet it’s the interpersonal performance of
expression and behavior which creates lived experience and
“reafffirm[s] . . . the moral values of the community.”171
The tropes of the courtroom as a stage and the trial as

169. Rowden, supra note 93, at 274 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
170. ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION
(paperback ed. 1959).

OF

SELF

IN

EVERYDAY LIFE

171. Id. at 35. “To the degree that a performance highlights the common official
values of the society in which it occurs, we may look upon it, in the manner of
Durkheim and Radcliffe-Brown, as a ceremony – as an expressive rejuvenation
and reaffirmation of the moral values of the community.” Id. Goffman is
concerned to explain performance in everyday interactions, whereas formal legal
proceedings, of course, are already structured by procedural rules and the
deployment of government officials. Our contention is that conducting the
proceedings in a courtroom enables participants to interact expressively, and
thus reaffirm (or not) the community’s moral values, in ways they cannot when
the “same” proceedings are conducted entirely online.
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theater are well worn and sometimes criticized172 but
nevertheless valid and pertinent here. “Drama and trial are
allies. . . . [In each,] the politics of staging, visualizing, and
demonstrating [take center stage]. [T]he right behavior is
precisely the art of acting well in the eyes of the subjects
watching the performance.”173 The display of demeanor and
emotion in court are part of an essential theatrical representation of the events in dispute, imposing on each
witness, litigant, and lawyer (and possibly judge) the
demand to “act well” in the eyes of the audience.
Certainly, as Robert Ferguson reminds us, the theatrical
nature of trials in physical courtrooms can affect legal
judgment by eliciting stereotypical emotional performances
and potentially penalizing witnesses and parties who fail to
“act well.” This is part of what he describes as the “aura” of
the courtroom. The emotional environment created by
courtrooms, however, makes them valuable as sites of justice
for a reason that is not reducible to ritual or mystique.
Courtrooms, as noted above, are configured to enable dialogic
speech and expression among physically co-present
participants, and these two features of the courtroom
facilitate intelligible emotional interactions. The emotions
people feel and express in social interactions are subject to
constant modulation and recalibration based on the momentto-moment feedback provided by facial expression, tone of
voice, and posture.174 That is, each person can more readily
172. E.g., FERGUSON, supra note 10. Peter Goodrich has examined at length the
complex interplays among law, theater, and rhetoric throughout Western legal
history. Peter Goodrich, Law, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RHETORIC 417, 418 (Thomas
O. Sloane ed., 2001).
173. Cornelia Vismann, “Rejouer les crimes” Theater vs. Video, 13 CARDOZO
STUD. L. & LITERATURE 119, 127–28 (2001).
174. “[E]motions in social settings emerge during moment-to-moment
interactions” but “[e]motion construction at any one point in time is constrained
by the ongoing or developing relationship in which it takes place” and “depends
on the larger sociocultural context.” Michael Boiger & Batja Mesquita, A
Sociodynamic Perspective on the Construction of Emotion, in THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
CONSTRUCTION OF EMOTIONS 377, 379–82 (Lisa Feldman Barrett & James A.
Russell eds., 2015).
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read the other and know that he or she is being read.175 Each
significant dyad—defendant-judge, lawyer-witness, witnessjury, juror-juror—features this kind of emotional interaction.
Other participants, observing these interactions, can more
readily interpret them as well. Judges, for instance, rely on
these moment-to-moment affective cues when engaging,
together with other participants, in the emotional
management of their courtrooms.176 On a video conference,
in contrast, where participants often seem to be addressing
everyone (or no one in particular) and it’s difficult to follow
where they are looking,177 emotional interactions can seem
illegible and inscrutable.
The physical courtroom thus yields a more transparent
emotional environment than the virtual court does, inclining
decision-makers in physical courtrooms to feel that they are
judging rightly. By making emotions available in a way that
the videoconferencing interface does not and by affording
decision-makers themselves more opportunities to observe
and engage in emotional interaction, proceedings in
courtrooms can enhance decision-makers’ (and the public’s)
sense that the proceedings are revealing more of the human
truth of things, however misled they may be by their
stereotypical expectations for how parties and witnesses
should express themselves. And if decision-makers have the
impression that they are taking more of the witnesses’ and
parties’ psychological reality into account, whether that
cashes out in assessments of credibility, character, or both,

175. GOFFMAN, supra note 165. In face-to-face, physically co-present
interactions, “sight begins to take on an added and special role. Each individual
can see that he is being experienced in some way, and he will guide at least some
of his conduct according to the perceived identity and initial response of his
audience.” Id. at 16.
176. See, e.g., Stina Bergman Blix & Åsa Wettergren, A Sociological
Perspective on Emotions in the Judiciary, 8 EMOTION REV. 32 (2015); Terry
Maroney, Emotional Regulation and Judicial Behavior, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1481;
Sharyn Roach Anleu & Kathy Mack, Magistrates’ Everyday Work and Emotional
Labour, 32 J.L. SOC’Y 590 (2005).
177. See supra notes 49–55, 89 and accompanying text.

2020]

VIRTUAL TRIALS

1329

they may feel that their judgment process is more grounded
and more complete, leading them in turn to feel that the
process is going well.178 Jurors in particular “want to feel
right about their decisions . . . striving to work their emotions
and their judgments into a satisfying totality.”179 Believing
that they have had access to witnesses’ and litigants’
relevant emotions and registering how they themselves have
responded emotionally during the flow of the proceedings,
they are more likely to regard their experience and their
judgments as well-grounded and authentic. The co-presence
of their fellow jurors in the courtroom and the jury room also
helps them to negotiate the group’s emotional response,180
which can reinforce their sense that they are judging rightly.
This is not to say that the resulting verdicts are likely to
be more factually accurate, assuming that one could access
the ground truth apart from the legal process itself.181
However, insofar as every legal outcome reflects a moral
judgment about the parties in light of the values the
community deems important,182 and emotions are not mere
bodily signals about how things are going for the person
experiencing them183 but also judgments of value, of what
ought to matter,184 decision-makers who take more
emotional information into account and feel right about their

178. See generally Gerald R. Clore & Jeffrey R. Huntsinger, How the Object of
Affect Guides Its Impact, 1 EMOTION REV. 39 (2009).
179. NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME 106–07 (2000).
180. See, e.g., PAULA NIEDENTHAL ET AL., PSYCHOLOGY OF EMOTION:
INTERPERSONAL, EXPERIENTIAL, AND COGNITIVE APPROACHES 235–36 (2006).
181. See Neal Feigenson, Emotional Influences on Judgments of Legal Blame:
How They Happen, Whether They Should, and What to Do About It, in EMOTION
AND THE LAW: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 45, 63–64 (Richard Wiener & Brian
Bornstein eds., 2010).
182. See BURNS, supra note 1.
183. See generally LISA FELDMAN BARRETT, HOW EMOTIONS ARE MADE (2017);
ANTONIO DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR (1994).
184. See generally Martha Nussbaum, Emotions as Judgments of Value, 5 YALE
J. OF CRITICISM 201 (1992).
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decisions can judge better in this broader sense.185

185. In contrast, those who conceive of legal proceedings as basically a matter
of task-oriented information exchange as opposed to interactive moral judgment
may be right that videoconferencing (or audioconferencing, for that matter) is not
inferior to face-to-face interactions. See Judee K. Burgoon et al., Testing the
Interactivity Principle: Effects of Mediation, Propinquity, and Verbal and
Nonverbal Modalities in Interpersonal Interaction, 52 J. OF COMM. 657 (2002).
This is also not to say that judges or jurors will experience decision-making as
easier in physical than in virtual courtrooms. If anything, the increased
availability of affective information, other participants’ and their own, may make
integrating those emotions with their cognitions more challenging. The claim is
that to the extent that they are able to integrate all of this information, they are
likely to feel satisfied that they are judging well.
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III. PUBLIC TRIALS
The iconic courtroom drama, for all its laser focus on the
main stage action between attorneys and witnesses, often
widens the lens to include another important character as
well: the audience. The courtroom audience in legal dramas
plays various roles. It may act as a Greek chorus reflecting
and guiding our own emotional reactions to the legal
confrontations, or as a counterpoint to the moral message—
a depiction of small-town prejudice, for example. It may
function as a sort of expanded jury, reacting to the evidence
for the benefit of jurors and lawyers, as in Anatomy of a
Murder.186 It may by its very presence signal the triumph of
the rule of law, as Judgment at Nuremberg187 did. It may,
collectively, play a more active role, attempting to encourage
a verdict through a unified presence, whether supportive,
outraged,188 or intimidating.189 It may, as the courtroom
gallery in To Kill a Mockingbird190 memorably did, depict
hierarchy in the way townsfolk are seated (with all black
spectators in the balcony and white spectators on the same
level as the core dramatic actors). It may, as Inherit the Wind
ingeniously did, emphasize the importance of the audience
by showing the deflated face of Williams Jennings Bryan
when the judge politely offered him a chance to address the
(empty) courtroom after the verdict had been rendered.191
The camera may home in on individual reactions, for
example Scout’s sorrow and shock at the verdict on behalf of

186. ANATOMY OF A MURDER (Columbia Pictures 1959).
187. JUDGMENT AT NUREMBERG (Amber Entertainment 1961).
188. The portrayal of the outraged clamor of the white citizenry as lynch mob
quite explicitly illustrated the fragile boundary between the lawless mob and the
trial, both in Tom’s narrow escape from lynching and in the way the trial that did
take place simply placed the veneer of public justice on the foreordained killing
of an innocent man. See TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (Brentwood Production 1962).
189. See infra note 208 (reference to the “sea of blue”).
190. See Radul, supra note 158.
191. INHERIT THE WIND (United Artists 1960).
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her father, her town, and her ideals.192 It may focus on the
reactions of the families of the parties (as in A Lesson Before
Dying,193 where the camera lingers on the devastated
reaction of the defendant’s grandmother to the defense
attorney’s reference to “putting a hog in an electric chair”194).
It may showcase attorneys performing for one another195 or
attending a trial to watch other attorneys perform.196 Or it
may capture a non-verbal exchange between witnesses and
spectators—a gesture of support197 or of intimidation.198
Once the verdict comes down, it often captures the frenzy of
reporters sprinting for the telegraph or phone to share the
news with the wider public, sometimes even depicting phone
lines, excited chatter, and rapidly multiplying newspapers to
illustrate the viral spread of the news.199
The array of roles ascribed to spectators is not just an
artifact of popular culture; it reflects a similar profusion of
roles in legal theory and practice. In these images so
memorably captured in film and the popular imagination,
the public trial achieves a number of goals. As Ferguson
describes:
Courtrooms . . . become the face of the law, the place where outside
observation operates as a check on authority. Habeas corpus . . .

192. TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD, supra note 188.
193. See, e.g., A LESSON BEFORE DYING (HBO 1999).
194. Id.
195. See, e.g., LEGALLY BLONDE (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 2001).
196. See, e.g., Better Call Saul (AMC television broadcast) (scenes in which
Kim Wexler observes criminal trials in order to decide whether to change from
corporate law to indigent criminal defense).
197. MY COUSIN VINNY (20th Century Studio 1992) (showing the approving nod
of a woman in the audience when a witness declares that no self-respecting
Southerner cooks instant grits).
198. For example, in the first episode of The Wire, McNulty observes the trial
of D’Angelo Barksdale, both out of interest and to assert his presence. Drug kingpin Stringer Bell sits in the audience, watching the star witness against his
nephew recant her testimony to permit D’Angelo to walk free. The Wire: The
Target (HBO broadcast June 2, 2002).
199. See CHICAGO (Miramax 2002).
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signifies the right of the accused person to appear in public before
a judge, where judgment itself can be judged. When a trial proceeds
inappropriately—when even a minority of observing citizens believe
it to be unjust . . . the law and its officials face public criticism.
Debate then extends beyond the courtroom, leading to controversy
of a different order and magnitude.200

Although Ferguson is writing here primarily about high
profile trials, his points apply across the board. A public trial
helps safeguard justice by promoting transparency. It
provides an incentive for the principals to conduct
themselves appropriately and fairly in the eyes of the
immediate audience and the community that audience
represents. It serves as a powerful reminder that the
proceedings are not merely a private interchange, but a
function performed on behalf of the community, in which
community-wide problems are addressed and norms
articulated. But there are a number of unresolved tensions
inherent in the notion of a public trial. Whose right is the
right to a public trial? What precisely is the function of
spectators in securing this right, and to what extent does it
depend on their proximity in time and space? How does the
role of spectators differ from the wider goals of public
education and norm elucidation, and how does a public trial
achieve these goals?
There is nothing inherently problematic about the fact
that a trial performs many functions at once, assuming it is
able to perform them properly. The current pandemic,
however, forces courts and others to grapple with precisely
what these functions are, and how to best replicate them
when the public’s physical, contemporaneous presence may
be out of the question. Even then, we might consider this a
temporary problem, on the theory that eventually trials can
simply return to their previous ways and their previous
reliance on the ill-defined nature of the public trial
guarantee. This would be a missed opportunity.

200. FERGUSON, supra note 10, at 1.
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The Audience: Off the Radar
The foundational texts that give rise to the public trial
guarantees are familiar, but not nearly as straightforward as
they may appear. The Sixth Amendment’s right to a fair trial
is one of a series of trial rights accorded to the criminal
defendant. It is commonly stated that this right “belongs to
the defendant rather than the public.”201 Meanwhile, the
right of the public and press to attend a trial, whether
criminal or civil, is said to inhere in the First Amendment.202
As Justice Brennan explained, “open trials are bulwarks of
our free and democratic government.” Public access to court
proceedings is an essential check and balance because
“contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an
effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power.”203
This division of labor between the right of the defendant and
the right of the public oversimplifies, or at least fails to
capture adequately, the complex role of public trials where
norms are articulated and enforced not merely for the parties
present, but for the citizenry more generally.204

201. WAYNE LAFAVE ET AL., PRINCIPLES
INVESTIGATION 558 (2d ed. 2009).

OF

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: POST-

202. See id.; see also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 599
(1980) (Stewart, J., concurring). Although Richmond Newspapers concerned a
criminal trial, it has been widely interpreted to guarantee a right to access in
civil trials as well.
203. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 592 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice
Burger, writing for the majority, also explained that making trials public
“provid[es] an outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion” in reaction
to outrageous crimes, discouraging vigilantism and maintaining respect for the
justice system, a pertinent observation with regard to our discussion of victim
impact statements in sexual assault cases. See id. at 571.
204. See generally Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a PostTrial World, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2173 (2014) (demonstrating an important
treatment of this topic and an argument for a more fully articulated recognition
of the role of the audience); see also Justin D. Rattey, Whose Jury: Mediating
Between the Competing Individual and Collective Jury Rights (May 28, 2020)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3612477 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3612477 (arguing that there
are at least two versions of the right to a jury: the individual right of the
defendant and the collective public right to have criminal charges adjudicated).
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No public is present in courtrooms on Zoom. But there
are a number of disconnects in the current discourse about
public trials that make it difficult to assess what aspects of
the public trial are essential to recreate or replace on Zoom.
One is between the active and sometimes outsized role the
audience plays in courtroom dynamics and the treatment
this role receives in the legal literature. Legal scholars tend
to treat “the trial” as synonymous with the main stage (or
“front stage”205) action, and to ignore the presence and
significance of the offstage action.206 Indeed, once the trial is
memorialized in a transcript, the role of the spectators in the
courtroom dynamics is rendered invisible. At that point the
role of the public refers only to the larger public—the
subsequent audience that is introduced to the action via the
media.
Robert Ferguson gives a rich description of the role of the
courtroom audience, but one that casts it in the traditional
role of passive observer, at least during the trial:
We tend to forget that trials perform many different functions at
once. . . . .
[And] these . . . compete with each other and complicate
perception. Caught within them, though without an explicit role to
play, is the participant observer, symbol of the public in a public
trial. . . . Participant observers exemplify and strengthen public
decorum through the passivity of their presence, but their interest
in a case carries them beyond what is being said and done in
court.207

Yet the role of the physical audience in a trial is not
always that of passive observer. In a civil rights suit against
a police officer or a criminal trial where a police officer is the
defendant, for example, not uncommonly the audience
205. See, e.g., SARAH BETH KAUFMAN, AMERICAN ROULETTE: THE SOCIAL LOGIC
175 (2020).

OF DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING TRIALS

206. Except in situations where that behavior is itself raised as an issue. See,
e.g., Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006). But see Rose & Diamond, supra note
72, for an in-depth consideration of offstage behavior.
207. FERGUSON, supra note 10, at 19.
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resembles a “sea of blue”—row upon row of uniformed police
officers.208 The intent to provide support is clear, but the
show of solidarity may, intentionally or unintentionally,
evoke a host of other emotions in jurors, judges, litigants, and
other members of the audience.209 Also not uncommon are
displays of support among victims’ family members, perhaps
wearing large pins with photos of the victim.210 The offstage
action is decidedly part of the courtroom dynamic, and this
is true even when the spectators do not intentionally
organize shows of solidarity. Sarah Beth Kaufman recounts
that when she observed the delivery of victim impact
statements, the pain the family member described was “met
with almost universal empathy from the people in the
courtroom. . . . Audience members cried, passed tissues, held
hands, and comforted one another.”211
None of these dynamics are transcribed. Ignoring them
doesn’t make them go away, but it does make it difficult to
evaluate them and determine what role they play and ought
to play. The specter of virtual trials makes this reckoning all
the more crucial. In most virtual trial pilot programs, the
virtual backstage consists of private areas, invisible to
participants, and there is no spectator section at all, much
less one engaged in a complex synchronous dynamic with the
main stage action. If this is seen as unproblematic, it ought
to signal the need for a larger reckoning about why we
currently permit these powerful currents to affect the
outcome of trials in physical courtrooms, and to do so entirely
under the radar.212

208. KAUFMAN, supra note 205, at 181.
209. See id.
210. See Carey, 549 U.S. at 70.
211. KAUFMAN, supra note 205, at 173–74.
212. There has thus far been little attention to the loss of a backstage and
audience in virtual proceedings. There may be several explanations for this
inattention. First, the legal professionals (judges, lawyers, court administrators)
whose views about the matter predominate may simply not be paying that much
attention to what they have regarded as inessential. Second, people generally
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The Courtroom: The Prosaic Reality
Any discussion of what is gained and what is lost in a
move toward virtual court proceedings must acknowledge an
important disconnect between the imagined pre-COVID
baseline and the actual baseline. Specifically, the iconic trial
exists mainly in the breach. Pre-pandemic, trials were
already extremely rare. Civil disputes are increasingly
resolved in administrative settings, arbitrations, or other
events that have little in common with public trials.213 The
vast majority of criminal cases are decided by guilty pleas.
Many other proceedings were being conducted virtually,
without a public audience, before the pandemic: an
increasing number of arraignments, bail hearings, and
parole hearings, as well as many immigration and asylum
cases, providing some early, troubling evidence that virtual
hearings may be less protective of the rights of petitioners.214
Thus, any discussion of the values advanced by public trials
should also consider which of these values are lost in the
broad range of cases where the public is already largely or
entirely absent, and whether these values can be better
safeguarded even in non-pandemic conditions.
In addition, many actual trials bear little resemblance to
the iconic trials of popular imagination. Consider this
excerpt from the description of Courtroom 302 in the Cook
County Criminal Courthouse, in Steve Bogira’s book of the

adapt pretty quickly to new environments, and as they become more accustomed
to interacting virtually, they may just come to accept as normal what’s actually
a diminished sort of human interaction. See, e.g., TURKLE, supra note 154. That
is, the loss will come to seem unproblematic because people are no longer aware
of what’s been lost. Third, the sorts of proceedings that have actually been
conducted online thus far, with isolated exceptions, have not been criminal trials
or jury trials, much less the high-profile cases Ferguson writes about. Rather,
they have mostly been the sorts of proceedings for which there wouldn’t have
been much of an audience anyway, which might also help account for what seems
to be the general inattention to the absence of the in-court audience. As trials
begin to move online, this will be an interesting dynamic to watch.
213. See RESNIK, supra note 3 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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same name:
A drab gray carpet covers the floor, and a chintzy fabric is peeling
from the walls. . . . .
The courtroom’s only windows are in the gallery . . . . On sunny
mornings the reflection on the Plexiglas [which separates the
spectator gallery from the rest of the courtroom] makes it hard to
see into the courtroom from the gallery. The courtroom proceedings
are transmitted to the spectators via ceiling speakers. [Sometimes
the judge flips off the speakers for a private interchange and then
forgets to turn them back on]. When he does, the spectators usually
sit in meek silence at first . . . . Before one of them risks an act so
bold as tapping on the Plexiglas . . . a courthouse regular [will
usually] come to the rescue, approaching the glass doors with a
hand cupped behind an ear, and [the judge] will lean forward and
restore the audio.215

Nicole Gonzalez van Cleve also wrote a searing portrait
of the Cook County Criminal Courthouse, emphasizing the
racial inequities exacerbated by and reflected in the
architecture of the courtroom. She recounts:
An elderly black woman sat silent and still in a courtroom. She
hypnotically gazed at the courtroom proceedings through
bulletproof glass as white professionals . . . casually navigated the
daily exchanges that defined the court call . . . . The microphone was
off, so you couldn’t hear, but you could see the professionals laugh
and smile as if they were in a casual workplace. The interaction was
like watching a silent movie and the audience of mostly black and
brown people who sat watching . . . were like obedient churchgoers
at a solemn funeral.216

In short, proximity and physical presence have long been
scarce commodities in some courtrooms and in many types of
proceedings. As the above accounts powerfully capture,
courtrooms can be intimidating, hierarchical, exclusionary
places in which even those with the most direct stake in the
proceeding—waiting witnesses, family members, and the

215. STEVE BOGIRA, COURTROOM 302: A YEAR BEHIND THE SCENES IN AN
AMERICAN CRIMINAL COURTHOUSE 34–35 (2005); see also Eagly, supra note 48.
216. NICOLE GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, CROOK COUNTY: RACISM
AMERICA’S LARGEST CRIMINAL COURT 22 (2016).

AND INJUSTICE IN
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litigants themselves—feel disempowered and alienated.217
The public courtroom’s loftier purposes, its role in checking
abuse or in educating the community, may at times seem
abstract and out of reach in the lower state and local courts.
For example, Van Cleve describes Cook County Criminal
Court’s treatment of court-watchers, particularly non-white
court watchers, as far from welcoming.218 It does not need to
be this way. Thus, the question is not merely how to provide
a simulacrum of what we had pre-pandemic. A better
approach is to focus on the values the public trial is meant to
advance and how they can best be achieved.
Participants and Audiences: Victim Impact Testimony
As we’ve noted, trials perform many functions at once,
and sometimes these functions are at odds. It’s useful to
tease out these functions and what arrangements they
require. Victim impact testimony provides a rich context for
a version of this exercise. According to the U.S. Supreme
Court, the appropriate audience for these statements is the
sentencing judge (in most criminal cases) or jury (in capital
cases), who can use the information about the impact of the
crime as a factor in sentencing.219 In the lower courts, victim
impact statements are widely thought to serve additional
purposes. Victims and survivors are told that delivering the
statements will help them heal and provide a kind of
catharsis.220 The statements are also viewed as a way to

217. See, e.g., Mulcahy, Unbearable Lightness of Being, supra note 124, at 480–
81.
218. VAN CLEVE, supra note 216, at 22–28.
219. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 820 (1991).
220. See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUST., VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS (2020),
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-vns/victim-impact-statements (noting that
delivering victim impact statements may help provide closure for victims: “What
is the purpose of a Victim Impact Statement? It provides an opportunity to
express in your own words what you, your family, and others close to you have
experienced as a result of the crime. Many victims also find it helps provide some
measure of closure to the ordeal the crime has caused.”). But see Susan A. Bandes,
Victims, Closure, and the Sociology of Emotion, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1
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confront defendants face to face with the harmful
consequences of their actions, ideally eliciting remorse or
empathy from the defendant (which, presumably, would
show in the defendant’s facial expression).221 The statements
may also play a public education function, alerting the
community more broadly to the nature of the harm.222
The dialogic dimension of victim impact statements, so
critical to their cathartic and moral educational goals, is
seldom clearly articulated, and needs to be parsed from the
rather ambiguous literature on the purposes of the
statements.223 For the formally recognized purpose of
conveying “information”224 about the nature of the harm to
the sentencer, the judge or jury needs a sight line to the
victim or family member. A reciprocal sight line isn’t really
necessary, since the information flows only from victim to
fact-finder, although (as mentioned in Part I) the victim may
benefit from being able to see how her words are being
received. Affording synchronous interaction becomes more
urgent when we move to the goals of healing and catharsis
for the victim and moral education for the defendant.225
(2009) [hereinafter Bandes, Victims, Closure]; Susan A. Bandes, Closure in the
Criminal Courtroom: The Birth and Strange Career of an Emotion, in EDWARD
ELGAR RES. HANDBOOK ON L. & EMOTION (forthcoming Susan A. Bandes et al. eds.,
2020) [hereinafter Bandes, Closure in Criminal Courtroom] (critiquing the
concept of the courtroom as a site for “closure” for crime victims).
221. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse
and Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 90 (2004).
222. See the MADD victim workbook; Bandes, supra note 220, at 14.
223. See Susan Bandes, What Are Victim-Impact Statements For?, THE
ATLANTIC (Jul. 23, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/07/
what-are-victim-impact-statements-for/492443/.
224. Note the use of the word “information” here, the general refusal of victim
impact statement jurisprudence to deal with the emotional dimensions of the
statements, and with how the information verbal statements impart differs from
that imparted by a written statement read to the fact-finder. See Susan A.
Bandes, Share Your Grief but Not Your Anger: Victims and the Expression of
Emotion in Criminal Justice, in EMOTIONAL EXPRESSION: PHILOSOPHICAL,
PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (Joel Smith & Catherine Abell eds.,
2016).
225. We do not suggest that we consider these goals appropriate, and have

2020]

VIRTUAL TRIALS

1341

These require proximity, or at least clear sight lines between
victim and defendant as well as between victim and judge, to
allow the victim to feel seen, heard and, ideally, understood.
In the sexual assault cases against U.S. Gymnastics and
Michigan State doctor Larry Nassar, for instance, victim
after victim expressed the importance of the opportunity to
face Nassar and tell him directly of the harm he had done.226
One concern with this dialogic aspect is that it depends
on behavior that can’t be regulated: the facial expression,
body language, and posture of the defendant. For example,
Chanel Miller recounted that after Brock Turner was
convicted of raping her, she sought to deliver her victim
impact statement to him directly, but he, as well as other
important court participants, refused to face her:
I looked straight at the judge, meeting his eyes repeatedly,
reminding him I was not done. I pointed at the back of the defense
attorney’s cotton-haired head. He never turned to face me. I bore
into the side of Brock’s unmoving face, his stoic profile. I was rooted,
pointing at him. I wanted everyone consumed by my voice, in my
control.227

In another case, a mother addressed her daughter’s
murderer directly, telling him she had “no room in her heart
for hating him. But the defendant would not look at her, nor
at the photo she held of her daughter. He stared impassively
ahead, his big sloping shoulders still as a rock.” She said
later: “I wanted to make sure he knew I was there.” But she
“could see nothing in his eyes.”228 Others make their peace
with the lack of a reaction. Rebekah Gregory, who lost a leg
in the Boston Marathon bombing, wrote an open letter to

elsewhere been critical of these uses of VIS and, indeed, VIS in general. See, e.g.,
Bandes & Salerno, supra note 43, at 1036–40; Susan Bandes, Empathy,
Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 410 (1996);
Bandes, supra note 220, at 1; Bandes, supra note 223.
226. See generally AT THE HEART OF THE GOLD: INSIDE
SCANDAL (S.J. Gibson Films & Sidewinder Films 2019).
227. CHANEL MILLER, KNOW MY NAME 230–31 (2019).
228. Bandes, supra note 224, at 21.

THE
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defendant Dzhokhar Tsarnaev after giving testimony, telling
him that even though he never looked her way, “I realized
that sitting across from you was somehow the crazy kind of
step forward that I needed all along.”229
These dynamics are rarely made explicit to the
participants themselves. Victims and survivors are
conscripted to deliver statements at a time of great
vulnerability and stress, induced by promises about justice
and closure,230 and one hopes they have been prepared for
the possibility of disappointment.231 The current pandemic
squarely presents the question whether physical proximity
in a public courtroom is a necessary condition for a victim or
survivor who wishes to make her presence felt and
communicate her pain. As we’ve discussed above, the lack of
physical proximity may dissipate some of the immediacy of
the face-to-face confrontation, reducing the possibility of a
rich emotional interchange.232 Yet virtual proceedings can
disinhibit as well as inhibit emotional expression. Though
the lack of immediacy might feel less immersive to the
unwilling participant, it might also feel less coercive.233 We
simply don’t know enough yet about how the move to virtual
platforms may affect the sorts of strong emotions that
victims often express at sentencing or that decision-makers
and others feel when hearing them. In general, although
we’ve speculated about this in Part I, we don’t yet know how

229. Id.
230. See DOJ guidelines, supra note 215; see also Bandes, supra note 220, at
16–17.
231. There is troubling evidence that this occurs less often than it should. See,
e.g., Eli Hager, They Agreed to Meet Their Mother’s Killer. Then Tragedy Struck
Again,
THE
MARSHALL
PROJECT
(July
21,
2020,
6:00
AM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/07/21/they-agreed-to-meet-theirmother-s-killer-then-tragedy-struck-again# (a powerful account of a restorative
justice conference gone wrong when the man who murdered their mother broke
the children’s hearts by deciding on the day of the meeting that he could not
attend).
232. See, e.g., Tait et al., supra note 48.
233. See Mulcahy, supra note 124, at 481–82.
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being on Zoom instead of in a physical courtroom will affect
participants’ understanding of others’ emotional displays—
or their absence.234
Victim impact statements also serve a symbolic function,
albeit a complex and highly contested one.235 In capital cases,
the symbolic function is often expressed by prosecutors and
victim advocates in terms of the importance of honoring the
victim’s life and publicly respecting the victim’s worth. In
other types of cases, the function may be different. In the
Nassar cases, where the crime at issue was sexual assault,
many of the statements communicated not just the victims’
need to face and tame a monster who had loomed far too large
in their lives, but also the desire to do so in the authoritative
environment of a courtroom where he was being held
accountable for his criminal acts. Indeed, the Nassar cases
exemplify the vexed role of the public courtroom in advancing
these goals. Judge Rosemary Aquilina drew evident
satisfaction and widespread praise for her role in comforting
and empowering the victims throughout the proceedings.
She “opened her courtroom to any victim who wished to
speak, for however long she wished to speak,” emphasizing
the cathartic nature of the speech (“leave your pain here”);
its public nature (the “whole world” is listening); and its role
in promoting accountability.236 She also made the victims an

234. For instance, in the physical courtroom, the defendant who “refuses to
face” the victim may do so by remaining in what could be construed as a respectful
posture toward the court, standing or sitting with his body oriented toward the
bench and his gaze lowered. On Zoom, where everyone’s usual and normative
body and head position is frontal and facing toward the viewer, the defendant, to
be seen as refusing to face the victim, would have to turn his body or at least his
head and shoulders to the side, a more evident rejection of the victim (and of
virtual courtroom norms). Ironically, though, on Zoom the defendant could
actually avoid looking at the victim precisely by looking into his laptop camera
and appearing to look at her. See supra Part I. Thus Zoom creates new
opportunities for disjunction between expressed and perceived demeanor and
hence for misunderstanding emotional interactions.
235. See, e.g., Bandes, Share Your Grief, supra note 224; Bandes, Victims,
Closure, supra note 220.
236. Scott Cacciola, Victims in Larry Nassar Abuse Case Find a Fierce
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unusual offer: she would keep her courtroom open to hear
and respond to additional victim impact statements, even
though the sentence had been handed down and the case was
formally over. Although this did not occur, her offer itself
neatly raises the question: which aspects of the courtroom
experience would be most important to the victims—
speaking in an imposing, iconic courtroom, a sacred physical
site at which justice rituals occur; knowing that they were
participating in an official proceeding on which legal
consequences hinge; or speaking in the presence (physical or
virtual) of spectators? Before the pandemic, it was rarely
necessary to disentangle these elements, but the existence of
virtual courts, where there is no physical courtroom and no
public presence of which participants are aware, provides an
opportunity to do so.
To examine the importance (or not) of a physically
present public and, more broadly, the role of spectators
outside as well as inside the courtroom in furthering the
values of public trials, we return to the Brock Turner case.
As noted earlier, Chanel Miller recounted that when she
delivered her victim impact statement, Turner refused to
face her.237 Her statement had no discernible impact on
Turner, who never evinced a satisfying understanding of the
gravity and the impact of the rape of which he stood
convicted. Moreover, she (and others) felt that the sentence
Judge Persky handed down after hearing her statement was
equally devoid of understanding of the harm Turner had
caused her. Speaking in a formal courtroom before a judge
and a live audience did not provide Miller with the healing
or vindication she may have sought; to the contrary, as she
recounts: “[w]hen the sentence was announced, the
immediate reaction I had was humiliation.”238 Healing or
Advocate: The Judge, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/01/23/sports/larry-nassar-rosemarie-aquilina-judge.html.
237. See MILLER, supra note 227.
238. Ellas Williams, Chanel Miller, Sexual Assault Survivor, On The “Immense
Relief” of going public, NPR (Sep. 23, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/09/23/

2020]

VIRTUAL TRIALS

1345

vindication did not come from the act of speaking alone. It
required both emotional reactions from others and some
sense that the legal outcome took her words into account.
What happened next was unusual. Miller shared her
victim impact statement with Buzzfeed and it went viral,
reaching eleven million people within four days.239 At this
point, the statement’s role in helping Miller heal and,
perhaps even more dramatically, its role as an instrument of
public education, became cleanly separated from its role as
information for the judge. The Buzzfeed statement was
credited with widely educating the public about the harm of
what was too often dismissed as “date rape,” evoking
tremendous empathy for the victims of such crimes.
Concurrent physical proximity, in this unusual case, turned
out to be unnecessary to the public education goal of the
public trial—although it certainly mattered that what Miller
shared with millions via Buzzfeed she had also declared in
open court, which imbued it with the cultural significance
that attaches to formal court proceedings and made Turner’s
and Persky’s responses part of the lesson. 240
The Public Beyond the Courtroom
We have focused in this Section mostly on the complex
roles of the public present in the courtroom. At least some of
the goals of the public trial articulated by the Supreme
Court, however, are furthered by the mediated access to open
763376211/chanel-miller-sexual-assault-survivor-on-the-immense-relief-ofgoing-public.
239. The 7,137-word-long victim impact statement by Miller, who was referred
to in court documents and media reports as “Emily Doe” for the sake of her
anonymity, was published by Buzzfeed on June 3, 2016, the day after Turner was
sentenced, and was reprinted in other major news outlets such as The New York
Times.
240. Note that ultimately the judge was recalled, and subsequently fired from
a job as a tennis instructor based on his ruling in the Turner case. Chris
Bumbaca, Judge in Brock Turner Case, Aaron Persky, Fired from High School
Tennis Coaching Gig, USA TODAY (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/sports/2019/09/12/brock-turner-case-judge-aaron-persky-fired-tenniscoaching-job-lynbrook/2297795001/.
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trials that the community obtains through the presence of
the print media, court watchers, and, where allowed,
cameras in the courtroom. Press coverage and responses via
comments or letters to the editor provide an outlet for
concern, hostility, and emotion to a far wider community
than the few who can fit into the courtroom gallery. The right
of the press to attend public trials, together with the right of
assembly, serves as a “catalyst” to the public’s ability to
exercise its free speech rights regarding the case.241 And of
course many more people can see justice being done if the
proceedings are available on television or the Internet and
not merely open to those in a physical courtroom.
Trials in physical courtrooms to which the press and the
public have access can perform these public educational and
community engagement functions. The victim impact
statements in the Larry Nassar proceedings, for instance,
were credited with shining a light on a hidden problem with
implications far beyond the courtroom—in this case, the web
of complicity that had protected a predatory doctor for many
years.242 Where courtroom proceedings are part of a larger
public relations campaign to achieve policy changes on an
issue of major importance, such as the litigation against big
tobacco or against gun manufacturers arising from mass
shootings,243 the publicity of the litigation is essential for the
campaign’s efficacy. Yet over the last two centuries,
courtrooms have allocated less and less space to the press
and public,244 and in places like the Cook County Criminal
241. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 577 (1980)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
242. This raises a difficult question: whether the sentencing hearing in an
individual criminal case is the appropriate forum for conducting an essential
inquiry into layers of complicity and coverups by an interlocking series of
powerful institutional actors. The fact that an official proceeding should occur
does not resolve the question of the nature of the forum in which it should occur.
243. William Haltom & Michael McCann, Litigation, Mass Media, and the
Campaign to Criminalize the Firearms Industry, 4 OÑATI SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES
725 (2014).
244. MULCAHY, supra note 112, at 83–107. Indeed, “line-standing” for the free
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Court, as we’ve mentioned, bulletproof Plexiglas further
impedes the public from being able to see and hear what’s
going on, while court officials have routinely discouraged
court watchers.245
Virtual courts pose additional challenges to the ideals of
the public trial. Obviously there’s no physical space for the
press, court watchers, or members of the public to gather and
observe. Some courts post links to livestreamed proceedings,
which the public may access from their homes or offices, but
observers can access only what is visible and audible on the
interface; as noted earlier, Zoom proceedings include none of
the offstage behaviors that can, for better or worse, play an
influential role in the emotional dynamics of the physical
courtroom. And some courts have apparently been
restricting access to virtual proceedings.246 All these
phenomena limit the ability of public trials to serve the goals
of transparency and accountability.
Moreover, by inviting the public’s presence, traditional
courtrooms and courthouses become quintessential public
things on which a living democracy depends.247 Particularly
where the litigation is of concern to the community, the
community wants the proceedings and the judgment to take
but very scarce seats at Supreme Court arguments has become a common
phenomenon and even a lucrative business. Katie Bart, Courtroom Access: Linestanding Businesses Save Spots in the Public Line, SCOTUS BLOG (Apr. 15, 2020),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/04/courtroom-access-line-standing-businessessave-spots-in-the-public-line/.
245. VAN CLEVE, supra note 216.
246. See, e.g., James Lartey, The Judge Will See You on Zoom, but the Public
Is Mostly Left Out, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 13, 2020),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/04/13/the-judge-will-see-you-on-zoombut-the-public-is-mostly-left-out; Kevin Penton, Court Accused of Blocking Public
Access
to
Trials
Amid
Virus,
LAW360
(June
29,
2020),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1287367/court-accused-of-blocking-publicaccess-to-trials-amid-virus.
247. BONNIE HONIG, PUBLIC THINGS: DEMOCRACY IN DISREPAIR (2017). “Public
things are part of the ‘holding environment’ of democratic citizenship; they
furnish the world of democratic life. They do not take care of our needs only. They
also constitute us, complement us, . . . and interpolate us into democratic
citizenship.” Id. at 5.
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place in a courthouse to which it has access.248 One
Australian judge has remarked that “the very presence of the
courts affirm[s] the presence of a community, of a society, by
reflecting its values back to itself.”249 Hearings and trials at
designated places known and accessible to the community
contribute to the community members’ sense of ownership of
the justice being performed in their name.250 Zoom
proceedings, by contrast, although convened by the courts
and possibly decorated with the seals or other symbol of their
authority, unavoidably drift toward the private sphere—the
homes or offices from which each participant separately joins
the meeting and each spectator watches, from his or her own
laptop or tablet.251 Virtual courts thus become a part of the
248. See, e.g., Jocelyn Simonson, The Place of “The People” in Criminal
Procedure, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (2019) (emphasizing the essential role of “the
People” generally and courtwatchers as one important representative of The
People, in protecting communal public interests).
249. Rowden & Wallace, supra note 152, at 518.
250. Or their sense of alienation from/oppression by it. See VAN CLEVE, supra
note 216. We would argue that even to the extent that adjudication in a particular
place and time is deeply flawed, as are the routine hearings in the criminal courts
van Cleve observed, the very fact that they were taking place in a specific location
enabled the author to study them more thoroughly (Van Cleve’s work depended
on the labors of many trained court watchers) and deepens her social critique:
Everyone in the community, as well as everyone in the relevant legal professional
community, knew or at least could see and know that injustices were being
systematically practiced in that courthouse, presenting a more vivid challenge to
what ought to be our sense of justice. “Public things” are no less public when they
provoke contestation as well as promoting group identity. HONIG, supra note 247.
251. One new source of anxiety for those broadcasting at home is Room Rater,
the “trendy twitter account that’s rating everyone’s living rooms.” See Heather
Schwedel, Rating the Trendy Twitter Account That’s Rating Everyone’s Living
Room, SLATE (Apr. 28, 2020), https://slate.com/human-interest/2020/04/roomrater-twitter-account-rated.html. The use of home as backdrop raises deeper
questions about the ways in which social and class cues provided by such
backgrounds may play on or exacerbate economic, cultural, ethnic and racial
stereotypes in a setting where legal decisions are being influenced. See, e.g.,
Regina Austin, Documentation, Documentary, and the Law: What Should Be
Made of Victim Impact Videos, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 979 (2010) (discussing social,
economic and racial cues in the context of victim impact videos); see also
Elizabeth Brico, Virtual Hearings Have Created a “Caste System’ in America’s
Courts, THE APPEAL, (Jul. 31, 2020) (describing the unequal technological
conditions in various homes: “[W]e’ve got people that are on laptops or desktops,
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ever-increasing privatization of formerly public life and
functions which increasingly characterizes our society.252
Public access to proceedings is crucial, and as we have
seen, it may be encouraged or discouraged in both physical
and virtual fora. Virtual courts could ensure broader and
more reliable access to livestreams. And when they do, public
access to Zoom proceedings actually offers an advantage over
access via cameras in the traditional courtroom: it permits
any member of the audience to observe what the participants
themselves observe, subject to protecting confidentiality
when appropriate.253 In a world of mediated proceedings,
Zoom offers public access that is unmediated by a court
administrator’s or technology consultant’s decisions about
where to locate and aim the cameras or a television
producer’s choices of how to edit the footage.254 In this
regard, Zoom proceedings may alleviate some of the concerns
about selective snippets that crop up frequently in
arguments against cameras in the courtroom.255 In any case,
and are perfectly centered, and the audio is great and everything is perfect. Then
we have some people that are calling in on their cellphones; then we have some
people that only call in on their home phone and so suddenly we have this
different class of people. I can’t help but think of the implicit bias between
prosecutors and judges and even defenders as to how you look at these people”
(quoting Rob Mason, director of the juvenile division of the Public Defender’s
Office in Florida’s Fourth Judicial Circuit)).
252. Not to mention that the software itself is privately owned, which means
that decisions governing its features and uses may be less amenable to
democratic input and access than is desirable in a public justice system.
253. For example, in some circumstances juror anonymity may need to be
preserved. In addition, Jenia Turner’s survey highlighted a growing concern
among criminal defense attorneys that their ability to engage in confidential
attorney-client communications is hampered in virtual settings. See Turner,
supra note 22 at 57–59.
254. So, for instance, the public watching broadcast courtroom proceedings,
and possibly some members of the public physically present in the gallery, might
not be able to see clearly those critical interactions we describe above in which
the defendant turns or doesn’t turn to face the victim and/or the victim’s family
member(s). On Zoom, whatever courtroom participants themselves see, the
viewing public sees as well.
255. See, e.g., Robert Kessler, Why Aren’t Cameras Allowed at the Supreme
Court Again?, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 28, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/
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virtual proceedings are here to stay,256 and a legal system
that does not keep current with modern technology may lose
the confidence of the public. 257
What lessons does the possibility of adjudicating without
a physically proximate public offer for the traditional
courtroom? At least some of the offstage behavior we now
take for granted is hard to justify: the sea of blue supporting
the defendant police officer in an excessive force case, the
homicide victim’s family and friends sporting buttons with
his picture on them, and certainly the father of one of Larry
Nassar’s victims, who, emboldened by Judge Aquilina’s
message of contempt for Nassar, asked whether he could
have five minutes alone to inflict punishment on Nassar, and
then assaulted him.258 We take for granted that criminal
defendants and even victims will be judged partly by the
presence and behavior of their family members in the

national/archive/2013/03/case-allowing-cameras-supreme-court-proceedings
/316876/ (quoting several U.S. Supreme Court justices who have expressed such
concerns). For example, Justice Kennedy in March 2007 opined that “[i]f you
introduce cameras, it is human nature for me to suspect that one of my colleagues
is saying something for a soundbite. Please don’t introduce that insidious
dynamic into what is now a collegial court.”
256. Reed & Alder, supra note 106; see also Madison Alder & Allie Reed, All
US Appeals Courts Embrace Arguing Streaming Due to Covid, BLOOMBERG LAW
(Aug. 4 2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ip-law/all-u-s-appeals-courtsembrace-argument-streaming-due-to-covid.
257. As one New Zealand judge has written: “One must express some concern
that if the court process is not seen as relevant to modern technologies and
modern means of communication, where then will lie the respect for the Rule of
Law?” This judge also posited of “digital natives” (persons born after about 1985)
in particular: “Their attitude towards the symbolism of the court is that the court
is a place where the requirement to be physically present at a certain place for
the disposal of court business may be seen as laughable, particularly when there
are other systems that are available.” Courts and Covid 19: Delivering the Rule
of Law in a Time of Crisis, THE IT COUNTREY JUSTICE (Mar. 26, 2020)
https://theitcountreyjustice.wordpress.com/2020/03/26/courts-and-covid-19delivering-the-rule-of-law-in-a-time-of-crisis/.
258. Christine Hauser, Victims’ Father Lunges at Larry Nassar in Court, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/02/sports/larry-nassarfather-victims.html.
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audience.259 The questions about whether the information
conveyed by the audience is relevant to good judgment are
not easy ones. As the popular images of iconic courtrooms
show, the members of the public who are present in court can
model appropriate emotional responses to the case or display
more transgressive ones; they can be the eyes and ears for
the wider community or, through their demeanor, they can
directly influence the participants. The problem is that these
sorts of social and emotional dynamics tend to occur below
the radar; despite important scholarly work on “offstage
behavior,”260 there is little explicit recognition in the legal
literature of how the audience affects the proceedings. The
point here is not to claim that the line between the audience’s
helpful and harmful effects is easily drawn. Rather it is that
if offstage behavior does play a useful role, the argument for
that role ought to be better articulated so it can be
scrutinized and debated.

259. See, e.g., Scott E. Sundby, The Jury As Critic: An Empirical Look at How
Capital Juries Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REV. 109, 1153 n.99
(1997) (juror recounting that the presence of the defendant’s uncle in court every
day, and in the hall of the courtroom reading a Bible, made a deep positive
impression on him).
260. See, e.g., Rose & Diamond, supra note 72.
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CONCLUSION
The courtroom has long existed as both a physical place
and as an ideal: an amalgam of values, beliefs, symbols,
norms, and behaviors that both reflect and shape legal
practice. In some regards, the courtroom, the jury, and the
trial have long been objects of study and fascination. Yet the
courtroom’s deep common-law roots, its mystique, its
longevity, and the sheer force of the status quo have long
protected it from the deepest levels of scrutiny—the kinds of
scrutiny that call into question our abiding faith in the value
of the open courtroom as a venue for observing demeanor,
and even the very notion of the “day in court” as a physically
situated, synchronous event. The sudden prevalence of
virtual legal proceedings offers a kind of forced natural
experiment and hence an unprecedented opportunity to
revisit what we value about adjudication in public
courtrooms, and to think about how best to ensure that court
proceedings, whatever form they may take, reflect and
reaffirm those values. A more critical approach to traditional
practices and received wisdom can enable us not only to
sharpen our appreciation for what is worth valuing but also
to make more informed trade-offs when what we value
conflicts, as it inevitably does, with competing needs and
concerns. Our goal in this Article has not been to resolve
those questions, but to seize the opportunity to ask them, and
to do so in light of the growing body of social science that can
help inform our best normative judgments.

